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Abstract
Enforcing access policies derived from management control principles is a way by 
which organisations protect their information assets. The minimum privileges 
principle is an example of a management control principle, which specifies that users 
should only have access to resources they require to carry out their duties. 
Requirements models use actors to specify their access policies. Actors normally 
represent roles that users adopt, however a role can have different meanings, such as a 
position in an organisation or the assignment of a task, and can therefore be 
misleading. Current requirements modelling approaches do not provide a systematic 
way of defining roles for incorporation into access policies, and therefore we can not 
ensure that they satisfy management control principles. In this thesis we address the 
need to provide precise role definitions by developing a framework that facilitates the 
derivation of roles from the organisational context. The framework consists of a meta­
model, which enables the organisational context to be represented and related to 
actors; a set of heuristics for deriving the organisational context; and a set of language 
constructs for formulating access policies, and verifying them using scenarios.
We use the meta-model and language constructs that we developed to extend an 
existing requirements modelling language, the i* framework, and in particular a 
formal version of it, formal Tropos, to define and verify access policies definitions 
satisfying the minimum privileges principle. We also investigate the use of automated 
tool checking by translating the formal Tropos definitions into the specification 
language Alloy, which is supported by a tool that automatically checks assertions, to
ensure consistency of the access policy definitions. We carry out a detailed case study 
taken from the literature to verify the extensions to the i* framework and the tool 
supported analysis.
The framework presented in this thesis makes a novel contribution to the 
modelling of access policies as requirements, enabling us to define access policies 
using actors derived from the organisational context, that satisfy the minimum 
privileges principle.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Security incidents can be very costly for organisations; Nick Leeson’s 
unauthorised trading resulted in losses of over £800 million, so causing the 
bankruptcy of Barings Bank (Brown & Steenbeek, 2001); there are similarities with 
the case of John Rusnak, who defrauded the Allied Irish Bank of a similar amount in 
2002 (Massaci & Zannone, 2006). In both cases the culprits exploited weaknesses in 
the computer systems designed to control their trading activities. These are prominent 
examples of a problem highlighted by Anderson (2001) that computer fraud is often 
caused by staff; i.e. authorised users, accidentally discovering features of a system, 
and exploiting them. There is a need to keep outsiders from breaking in, but, it is also 
equally important to prevent users with legitimate authorisation abusing their 
privileges in the way that Leeson and Rusnak did. Organisations have access policies 
based on the principles of management control to prevent these sorts of incidents 
happening. Access policies are the rules, which regulate how users can access 
resources (Moffett & Sloman, 1988). A problem was that the computer systems that 
Rusnak and Leeson used, did not adequately enforce these policies.
The focus of our research is on the modelling of security requirements based on the 
principles of management control. Nuseibeh & Easterbook (2000) provide an apt 
description of what we mean by modelling as “the construction of abstract 
descriptions that are amenable to interpretation”. In requirements models, users are
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represented by actors, which usually describe a role they are undertaking such as 
carrying out a task, or a position in an organisation. A weakness of current 
requirements modelling approaches is that they do not allow us to model all aspects of 
the organisational context and relate this to actors, which is a prerequisite for 
formulating requirements to enforce policies based on the principles of management 
control. In this thesis we differentiate between the micro- and macro-levels of the 
organisation. This follows the convention in the organisational behaviour literature 
when performing analysis, as exemplified by Rollinson (2005). The micro-level of the 
organisation is concerned with individuals, groups, and interpersonal relationships, 
whereas the macro-level of the organisation is concerned with the organisational 
structure, organisational design, and culture. When referring to the organisational 
context we therefore differentiate between the micro-organisational and the macro- 
organisational contexts to reflect these different levels of analysis.
The research we present in this thesis is aimed at strengthening the link between 
actors and the organisational context, to improve the process of defining access 
policies in requirements models, through the development of a framework. The 
framework consists of a meta-model, which enables the organisational context to be 
represented and related to actors; a set of heuristics for deriving the organisational 
context; and a set of language constructs for formulating access policies, and verifying 
them using scenarios.
This chapter outlines the background and motivation behind the work, and defines 
the objectives of the research. A road map of the thesis is also sketched.
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
The International Organisation for Standardisation code of practice for 
information security management (ISO, 2005) states that “information is an asset that, 
like other important business assets is essential to an organisation’s business and 
consequently needs to be suitably protected”. Security goals, from which security 
requirements are derived, are concerned with maintaining the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of assets, against the potential harmful actions of users (van 
Lamsweerde et al., 2003). Goals and requirements can be derived from a threats 
analysis, where the harmful intent of actors and their actions can be identified, and 
suitable countermeasures defined. However an additional source of security goals is 
the set of management control principles (Moffett et aL, 2004).
Management control principles are practices applicable to many large 
organisations, to ensure that employees perform their duties commensurate with the 
objectives of the organisation, and do not commit fraud. Fraud in commercial 
organisations is frequently caused by users who abuse their legitimate privileges 
(Anderson, 2001), a problem that existed before IT was introduced into organisations. 
Management control principles, originating from legislation, accounting and 
management practices, are implemented to prevent these sorts of incidents from 
taking place. These organisational control principles need to be enforced by computer 
systems used to manage valuable assets, and are translated into access policies 
(Moffett & Sloman, 1988).
Security engineering researchers, in developing access control solutions, have 
long since faced the problem of how to define access policies, and as a result there 
exists an extensive body of literature on this subject. Examples of this include the
- 12-
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definition of security clearances for military or governmental applications (Bell & 
LaPadula, 1973), separation of duties in commercial applications (Clark & Wilson, 
1987), delegation of duties (Moffett & Lupu, 1999; Barka & Sandhu, 2000), and 
contextually based restrictions (Georgiadis et al., 2001). An access policy can be 
based on a number of factors, such as membership of a group, the level of authority of 
an individual, a delegated task, whether this individual can perform other related 
tasks, temporal and other environmental constraints. Researchers in the security field 
have found roles a useful way of capturing these factors, and hence to define policies 
based on them. Access control that uses roles to define policies is Role-Based access 
control (RBAC) (Sandhu et al., 1996), a role being essentially a collection of 
permissions, but which map onto organisational roles.
There is an important parallel between, defining actors in a requirements model, 
and the research into RBAC, in that both are concerned with defining roles. 
Requirements models represent users as actors or agents that are assigned to actions. 
This assignment can be used to represent access policies (Liu et al., 2003). An actor 
represents a role. However a problem arises in that the use of the notion of a role can 
vary, from the assignment of a task, as proposed by Yu (1997), to a position within an 
organisational hierarchy (Sandhu et al., 1996). The fact that there is no clear 
definition as to what a role means can lead to ambiguity; this problem is exemplified 
by He et al. (2006), who found different terms were used to describe the same role.
Within the security research community there are key differences between the way 
in which researchers propose how roles should be defined to represent the 
organisation. For example Moffett & Lupu (1999) and Sandhu et al. (1996) differ in 
their views as to how the organisational hierarchy can be modelled using roles. It is 
not surprising that this is the case when we consider the view from the sociology
- 13-
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literature that in the most general sense a role is a term that describes behaviour 
(Biddle, 1979) as diverse as an angry parent to a government minister. There are 
different types of roles, for example there are positional roles, functional roles, and 
contextual roles (Biddle, 1979); to complicate this further, individuals adopt multiple 
roles at the same time (Handy, 1985).
Defining a role is therefore difficult (He & Anton, 2003). A role however is a 
means to an end, and in deriving roles they need to be defined in a way that enable us 
to derive access policies that satisfy the principles of management control (Moffett & 
Lupu, 1999), which entails relating them to the organisational context.
Most requirements modelling approaches, such as GBRAMS (Anton, 1996), 
KAOS (Dardenne et al., 1993), Use Cases (Cockbum, 2001), and CREWS (Maiden, 
1998) do not relate actors to the organisational context in that they do not show to 
which part of the organisation they are assigned, and what level of seniority they 
have.
However, there is a class of requirements modelling approaches that do derive 
requirements from the organisational context: the i* framework (Yu, 1997), ORDIT 
(Dobson et al., 1992), and an enterprise modelling approach proposed by 
Loucopoulus & Kavakli (1995). Nevertheless these modelling approaches have 
significant weaknesses with regard to their use in defining access policies. The i* 
framework, a goal-based modelling framework for representing dependencies 
between actors, tasks and resources, focuses mainly on individuals and their intentions 
in a social setting; i.e. the micro-organisational context. However access policies 
include the macro-organisational context; i.e. the way groups are structured, and the 
power structures that determine how tasks are delegated. ORDIT (Dobson & Strens, 
1994) and the approach proposed by Loucopoulos & Kavakli (1995) do include the
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macro-organisational context. ORDIT focuses on the delegation of responsibilities but 
neglects structural organisational relationships. In contrast the approach of 
Loucopoulos & Kavakli focuses on deriving goals from the organisational activities, 
but does not clarify the lines of authority and delegation.
Recently researchers in requirements engineering (RE) have turned their attention 
to deriving access policies from requirements models, focusing on the assignment of 
tasks and resources to actors, and how they can be refined into access policies. 
Fontaine (2001) has explored the mapping of agent assignments in KAOS, a goal- 
based modelling framework for modelling goal hierarchies, to authorisation policies 
in Ponder -  a language for specifying access control policies in distributed systems 
(Damianou et al., 2000). He (2005) has proposed the Requirements-Based Access 
Control Analysis and Policy Specification (ReCAPS) method, a set of heuristics, to 
derive roles from task assignments in order to define RBAC policies, and Liu et al. 
(2003) have proposed how dependencies between actors, resources and tasks in the i* 
framework, can be used for defining RBAC policies.
However what this research has not demonstrated is how to relate actors to the 
organisational context; thus we still do not have a satisfactory way of deriving precise 
actor definitions, and although researchers have demonstrated a systematic approach 
to defining policies, they have not demonstrated that these policies satisfy the 
principles of management control.
1.2 Problem Description and Research Objectives
In order to define access policies satisfying the principles of management control, 
a prerequisite is that we can relate actors to the organisational context. An example of 
a management control principle is the minimum privileges principle. The principle of
- 15-
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minimum privileges constrains users to access only those resources that they need in 
order to be able to carry out their tasks (Anderson, 2001). Users can carry out similar 
functions but in different organisational units; e.g., bank clerks carry out the same 
function in local branches, but should only access accounts in the branch to which 
they are assigned; thus the organisational unit, in this case the branch, is a constraint 
in an access policy definition. This poses a challenge, especially as current 
requirements modelling approaches do not give us an explicit link to the 
organisational context. With respect to requirements modelling, van Lamsweerde 
(2000b) raises some key questions that researchers have been tackling:
• What aspects to model?
• How to model such aspects?
• How to define the model precisely?
• How to the reason about the model?
In this thesis, we are, in effect, pursuing a subset of those broad questions that van 
Lamsweerde (2000b) posed with respect to requirements in general, except that we 
are focusing on the organisational context, and access policies derived from the 
minimum privileges principle. We focus on the minimum privileges principle because 
of its fundamental nature, and other principles build on it.
Therefore, the key objectives of the research in this thesis are to:
1. define the organisational context and to relate it to actors;
2. define policies that satisfy the principles of management control, and in
particular the minimum privileges principle;
3. verify scenarios are consistent with policies;
4. extend an existing requirements modelling approach, to relate actors to the
organisational context, and define policies.
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In this thesis we present a framework that comprises:
• a meta-model for defining the organisational context, and relating roles to the 
organisational context;
• heuristics for defining the organisational context, and deriving roles that relate to 
this organisational context;
• constructs for defining access policies satisfying the minimum privileges 
principle;
• constructs for defining scenarios;
• rules for verifying scenarios are consistent with policies.
The framework is actually independent of any specific requirements modelling 
approach, as it addresses the first three objectives, which are of a fundamental nature, 
in that they address what we need to model, and how it can be done independently of 
any given requirements modelling approach. The framework is defined formally in Z 
(Spivey, 1992) and gives us a meta-model, from which models of the organisational 
context for specific applications can be developed, and a set of constructs for 
formulating access policies and scenarios to verify these policies.
The fourth objective is to relate this framework to existing requirements modelling 
approaches. Rather than inventing a new language, it is sensible to extend an existing 
language, so that access policies can be modelled using the same language as other 
requirements. As described above there are a number of different approaches to 
modelling requirements. Of these approaches, the i* framework makes an ideal choice 
as it focuses on the social dependency of actors; organisations are in essence social 
systems. The i* framework uses a graphical language and is semi-formal; i.e. 
operationalised goals that refine into functions and constraints are defined in natural 
language. Recently, however, a variant of the i* framework has been developed,
- 17 -
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formal Tropos, which allows requirements to be formally defined. Although this 
thesis focuses on extending the formal Tropos notation, we also propose how i* 
diagrams can be extended.
1.3 Research Method
Our approach to this research is to identify the key concepts required for 
modelling access policies drawing on the literature in requirements engineering, 
security policies, and organisational behaviour. The RE literature gives us the basis 
from which we can extend existing approaches; the security policy and organisational 
behaviour literature enable us to identify new concepts that can be used to extend 
existing approaches.
We validated the framework with regard to its value as an engineering approach 
empirically. There are at least three empirical research methods for validating 
research in RE (Sim et al., 2003). The first is through experiments, the second is 
benchmarking, and the third is through case studies. Benchmarking and experiments 
have the advantage of allowing a direct comparison with other approaches using 
objective measures. However a case study approach is particularly appropriate in 
exploratory research, where the problem is not well understood or defined, as was the 
case of defining and analysing access policies in requirements models. Benchmarking 
and experiments are more appropriate in verifying theories that have already been 
well formulated. For this reason a case study approach was adopted. However, there is 
a danger in adopting a case study approach in that if it is tied to a specific situation, 
the findings can not be generalised. We have obviated this problem by selecting 
several case studies in diverse domains. We selected three case studies for 
exploration. The first case study, in the medical domain on the access policies for
- 18-
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medical records, was based on interviews we conducted with individuals who had 
experience of working in hospitals. The second case study, on access policies for 
resources in a software project, was based on the literature, and the author’s 
experience within a software development organisation. We took the third case study, 
on access policies within a large European bank, from the literature. We used the third 
case study to verify the practicality of using an extended requirements modelling 
language, formal Tropos, for defining policies, and verifying them using a tool that 
automates the analysis.
1.4 Thesis Contribution
In this thesis we identify the need to model the macro-organisational context as a 
prerequisite for defining access policies, and furthermore that concepts already exist 
in the organisational and security policy literature that can be used as a basis for this 
(Crook et al., 2002b).
We elaborate a framework that supports the modelling of access policies as 
requirements. The framework contains a meta-model that enables us to model key 
aspects of the organisational context, and from this to derive roles; the framework 
thus provides a link between roles and the organisational context. A set of heuristics 
provides a systematic way of deriving roles (Crook et al., 2002a; Crook et al., 2003).
The framework meta-model contains a construct that relates roles to tasks, which 
enables us to define access policies that satisfy the minimum privileges principle. In 
order to verify policies, the framework meta-model contains a set of constructs that 
enables us to define scenarios, and rules in the framework enable us to verify that the 
scenarios are consistent with the policies defined (Crook et al., 2002a; Crook et al., 
2003).
- 19-
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The thesis demonstrates how the language constructs can be used to extend the 
requirements modelling language the i* framework and the formal equivalent of it, 
formal Tropos (Crook et al., 2005), and how these constructs may be translated into 
the Alloy language and analysed using the Alloy model checker.
1.5 Thesis Road Map
The thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 describes the RE context of the work; we discuss alternative approaches 
to modelling requirements. The complementary nature of the different paradigms is 
highlighted. In particular we focus on security requirements, and identify two 
principle sources, which are threats and the principles of management control. We 
review approaches to modelling security requirements. We identify key weaknesses of 
modelling requirements derived from the principles of management using existing 
approaches, in particular the lack of a link to the organisational context.
In chapter 3 we review the security literature on the principles of management 
control, and how access policies maybe defined to enforce them. We also review the 
organisational literature to understand the organisational context, in particular the 
rationale for organisational structures. We then revisit the problem of relating actors 
to the organisational context in current requirements models to define access policies.
In chapter 4 we review the i* framework, a requirements modelling language, and 
a formal version of it, formal Tropos, in depth. The i* framework models the social 
context, representing the dependencies between actors, tasks and resources. Using a 
case study we show how it can be used for defining access policies, and how the 
weakness identified in the previous chapter, in relating actors to the organisational 
context impacts on these access policy definitions.
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Chapter 5 builds on the organisational characteristics elucidated in chapter 3; it 
addresses the second and third research objectives, proposing a framework for 
formally defining and refining access policies. The framework consists of a meta­
model, which enables the organisational context to be represented and related to 
actors in order to define access policies, and a set of heuristics for expressing policies 
and scenarios. We define a set of rules for verifying scenarios from policies. The 
model is presented in the formal language Z.
Chapter 6 addresses the research objective in relating this framework to existing 
requirements modelling frameworks, and how it can be integrated. We demonstrate 
how the organisational meta-model presented in the previous chapter can be applied 
to extending formal Tropos, and i* framework diagrams. We then revisit the case 
study we explored in chapter 4 to show how the extended formal Tropos language can 
be applied to define access policies, and scenarios. We show how the access policies 
defined in formal Tropos can be mapped on to the Z based meta-model presented in 
the previous chapter.
Chapter 7 addresses the problem of how to verify policies using the framework. 
We propose translating the Z constructs of the framework meta-model into a 
specification language, Alloy, which is supported by a model checking tool. Using the 
tool, we demonstrate how scenarios can be checked against policy definitions.
Chapter 8 demonstrates through the use of a case study how the extended formal 
Tropos requirements modelling approach can be applied, and how a formal Tropos 
model representing access policies can be translated into Alloy and analysed.
Chapter 9 summarises the conclusions and contributions of the thesis, and sets an 
agenda for future work.
Chapter 2
Modelling of Security 
Requirements
In this chapter we describe the Requirements Engineering (RE) context of the work 
in this thesis. We examine existing alternative approaches to modelling requirements. 
We then identify what security requirements are, and highlight the importance of an 
organisational procedure as a special type of security requirement.
2.1 Modelling of Requirements
Nuseibeh & Easterbrook (2000) describe the core activities of RE as eliciting 
requirements, modelling and analysing requirements, communicating requirements, 
agreeing requirements, and evolving requirements. Within these activities, the 
modelling of requirements is central, as it supports the other activities and provides a 
basis for performing reasoned analysis, to validate requirements, to ensure 
consistency, and identify conflicts. There is a plethora of ways to model requirements.
2.1.1 Early Approaches to Requirements Modelling
In the 1970’s and 1980’s the emphasis was on the how and what of requirements 
(van Lamsweerde, 2000b); i.e. data modelling (the what) and data transformations 
(the how). Initially, semi-formal approaches based on data-flow and entity 
relationship diagrams were widely used. However such modelling techniques were
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found to be inadequate due to limited structuring capabilities, and vague formulation 
using largely natural language (van Lamsweerde, 2000b). Subsequently formal 
specification languages came to the fore in the 1980’s and early 1990’s with 
languages such as VDM (Jones, 1990) and Z (Spivey, 1992); these mathematically 
based languages offered much richer structuring facilities, such as aggregation and 
instantiation, and allowed the expression of formal assertions. Formal languages are 
precise, and lend themselves to automated reasoning for detecting inconsistencies; 
they can also be used to validate specifications by animating them. A significant 
problem with regard to modelling requirements using these languages is that they do 
not separate the environment in which the system operates; i.e. the domain, and the 
description of the intentions of the system; these tend to be mixed up in a single 
specification (van Lamsweerde, 2000b). It is important to distinguish between the 
given problem domain and requirements (Jackson & Zave, 1997). The problem 
domain has “indicative” properties; i.e. properties of the environment that are given. 
Requirements are “optative” properties; i.e. they describe the system as it should be. 
This separation of concerns is necessary as the indicative properties of the problem 
domain represent constraints on how the system interacts with the environment, which 
can not be changed.
SCR is a specialised approach to requirements modelling, first proposed in the 
1970’s (Alspaugh et al., 1992; Heitmeyer, 2002), it was the first to separate the 
intentions from the problem domain. It is a formal approach to modelling, enabling 
one to specify the behaviour of parallel finite state machines, and was developed for 
modelling and verifying high assurance process control systems. There exists a tool 
set for automating consistency verification (Heitmeyer, 1998). Although it is highly
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suitable in modelling and simulating process control applications, it has limited 
capabilities in modelling the interaction with the environment (Zave, 1997).
In the 1990’s researchers began to address the question of what to model, which 
lead to the inclusion of additional conceptual units such as agents, goals, and events in 
requirements modelling approaches, in addition to entities and functions (van 
Lamsweerde, 2000b).
2.1.2 Goal-Based Approaches to Requirements Modelling
Goal based reasoning has become an important thread in RE research, and forms 
the basis of a number of modelling approaches. Goals are objectives that the system 
needs to achieve, through the co-operation of agents in the system to be (van 
Lamsweerde, 2000b). Understanding why requirements are needed helps stakeholders 
and analysts to ensure that requirements are complete, and to evaluate the inevitable 
trade-offs that occur as a result of conflicting system objectives (van Lamsweerde, 
2000b).
Various approaches to modelling goals and translating them into functional 
requirements have been proposed (Anton, 1996; Dardenne et al., 1993). Top level 
objectives can be successively refined into lower level goals; at the lowest levels 
system requirements can be articulated. One framework for modelling goals is KAOS 
(Knowledge Acquisition in automated Specification) (Dardenne et al., 1993). The 
framework comprises a language and a method for developing requirements models. 
A KAOS requirements model consists of a goal hierarchy. Low level goals are 
refinements of high level goals. At the lowest level are operationalised requirements, 
which are actions and constraints on those actions that fulfil low level goals. It
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incorporates a first order temporal logic notation to express goals and operationalised 
requirements. The formal notation lends itself to automated checking.
Another approach to deriving requirements using a goal hierarchy is proposed by 
Anton (1996). Anton proposes a method, the Goal Based Requirements Analysis 
Method (GBRAMS), for goal based analysis. The resulting model from this method is 
a goal hierarchy. In this respect it is similar to a KAOS model. However it is 
expressed in natural language rather than formally. Anton focuses more on the 
heuristics for eliciting goals and refining them. Again as with KAOS, an identification 
of potential agents and assignment to actions is part of the process.
There is a category of requirements, known as non-functional requirements 
(NFR’s), (Chung, 1991), such as performance, reliability, and also security. A 
different approach to defining and analysing non-functional requirements is necessary 
because, as Chung points out, they are often global constraints. The NFR framework 
(Mylopoulos et al., 1992) offers a way for analysts and designers to explore how 
design decisions can contribute to or obstruct NFR goals.
2.1.3 The Organisational Context in Modelling Requirements
The goals of a system are often embedded in an organisational context; the 
organisational structures and business rules form the basis of the rationale from which 
goals are derived (Nuseibeh & Easterbrook, 2000). An approach which focuses on the 
organisation is ORDIT (Organisational Requirements Definition for Information 
Technology) (Dobson et al., 1992; Strens & Dobson, 1994; Dobson & Strens, 1994). 
The basic premise behind this approach is that the organisational goals, policies, 
structures, and roles are essential to understanding organisational requirements from 
which a functional specification of the system can be derived. It includes a role
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model, which captures functional and structural relationships, and responsibilities. 
The identification of responsibilities and how they are delegated are key because these 
lead to the questions as to how a system will support a user in executing those 
responsibilities.
Loucopoulos & Kavakli (1995) propose a similar approach. The essence here is to 
combine the technical and social perspectives. The social perspective is represented as 
a model of the organisational members, and how they interact. Central to this view is 
an actor that can be an organisational unit or individual, and can be assigned roles 
representing the responsibilities held by the actor. The technical perspective is 
represented by a model of the activities, data, and information flow. These 
perspectives are combined in an enterprise model, which also includes a goal 
hierarchy.
The i* framework (Yu & Mylopoulus, 1994) also focuses on the organisational 
context, modelling goals in the form of intentions of actors and dependencies between 
those actors. This focuses more on individuals, their intentions and dependencies on 
one another, than on how they relate to the organisational structure, and how 
responsibility is delegated; i.e. the micro-organisational factors. More recently the i* 
framework has become part of the Tropos methodology (Giorgini et al., 2004). 
Tropos is a methodology for software development, supporting requirements analysis 
and software design. The i* framework is a semi-structured approach using diagrams 
and textual descriptions; recently a formal version of the i* framework, formal 
Tropos, has been proposed Fuxman et al. (2001). With formal Tropos goals, actions 
and constraints can be defined using the same first order predicate language with 
temporal constraints as used in KAOS.
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2.1.4 Scenario-Based Requirements Modelling
Although the incorporation of goals into a requirements model is appropriate, they 
may be difficult to elicit. Stakeholders may have difficulty defining abstract goals but 
find it easier to describe operational scenarios. Cognitive studies on human problem 
solving have borne this out (Benner et al., 1993), and in practice scenarios are widely 
used (Weidenhaupt et al., 1998). A scenario is a temporal sequence of actions or 
events, describing the way agents interact with the system. Scenarios are useful for 
clarifying and validating abstract requirements models, such as a goal-based models 
(Anton, 1997; van Lamsweerde et al., 1995). They also provide a suitable basis for 
identifying test cases.
One can differentiate between abstract scenarios, such as use cases and instance- 
based scenarios, which describe a specific situation (Maiden, 1998). Although there 
are advantages to conducting a scenario analysis there are also significant weaknesses 
(van Lamsweerde & Willemet, 1998). There is a problem in establishing whether a set 
of scenarios covers all the goals of the systems; i.e. they are inherently partial. It is 
difficult to identify conflicting goals; there is also a danger of explosion of scenarios 
with many different combinations of events and actions; the scenarios may be 
fragmentary without a clear link between them, even if one exists; and there is also 
the danger of specifying more details than are necessary in the way users interact with 
the system, imposing unnecessary constraints on the design (van Lamsweerde & 
Willemet, 1998).
Researchers have focused on how to combine the advantages of an abstract goal- 
based model and concrete scenarios to elicit, elaborate and validate requirements. 
Potts (1995) for example proposes a method to elicit salient scenarios. Before the 
scenario analysis is carried out, goals and obstacles to goals need to be identified. It is
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from these that salient scenarios are defined; what Potts means by salient scenarios is 
that each one describes a unique combination of goals being achieved or obstructed; 
he describes a set of heuristics to do this but does not propose how to represent them. 
Van Lamsweerde & Willemet (1998) propose a formal method to derive goals from 
scenarios. The method exploits the formal language of the KAOS framework, and is a 
rigorous approach to deriving a set of goals from scenarios, as the consistency 
between the goals and scenarios can be proven.
Use cases, which are a part of the of the Unified Modelling Language, have 
become very popular in practice, and have been a significant driving factor in 
organisations adopting scenario-based approaches (Weidenhaupt et al., 1998). Use 
cases are basically abstract scenarios describing all possible actions between the user 
and the machine and differ therefore from scenarios, which model specific sequences 
of actions (Maiden, 1998). Use cases are semi-formal in that text is used to describe 
the actions. In order to link goals with use cases, Cockbum (2001) recommends 
modelling high level use cases as goals, so in effect producing a similar model to 
those goal hierarchies we examined in the previous section. Formal approaches to 
abstract scenario analysis have been proposed using statecharts (Glinz,1995; Ryser & 
Glinz, 2001), message sequence charts (Uchitel et al., 2001), and trees (Hsia et al., 
1994). These approaches obviate some of the weaknesses of a use case analysis, in 
that it is possible to link different scenarios, and their formal nature lends them to 
automated analysis.
2.1.5 Domain Analysis
A parallel thread of research is on the domain and the specification (Jackson & 
Zave, 1997). Jackson & Zave take the viewpoint that goals are not the appropriate
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starting point for a requirements analysis; this is because high level goals can become 
divorced from the problem. They argue that the problem domain is the starting point;
i.e. to understand how the machine, representing the software to be designed, 
interrelates with its environment. Based on this philosophy, Jackson (2001) proposes 
an approach to modelling using problem frames. The premise of this approach is that 
the problem; i.e. the way in which the machine interrelates with the environment, can 
be broken down into sub-problems each of which is easier to solve. A problem frame 
represents a template of a class of simple problems, for which a known solution 
already exists. Jackson identifies several basic frames. During the analysis phase the 
problem is decomposed into sub-problems according to their frame types. Each sub­
problem is then analysed independently. Jackson argues that each type of problem 
frame requires its own specific analytical technique, and isolating each sub-problem 
in this way simplifies the analysis.
The idea that generic problem types exist and can be used as a basis for 
requirements analysis has also been identified by Sutcliffe & Maiden (1998). Sutcliffe 
& Maiden (1998), and subsequently Sutcliffe (2000) have built a library of 
generalised models that are applicable to different applications. For example the 
concept of object containment is applicable to both a library providing books, and a 
warehouse providing spare parts. As with problem frame analysis a key to this is the 
modelling of the problem domain. The advantage of this approach is the productivity 
gain in producing requirements specifications from reusable specification building 
blocks.
Although Zave & Jackson have suggested that goals are not an appropriate 
starting point, that is not to say that goals are inappropriate and that a domain analysis 
is better; as Sutcliffe & Maiden (1998) point out, a domain based requirements
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analysis is complementary to approaches such as those based on goals, in that in 
addition to a domain analysis, goals and scenarios also need to be defined. Indeed, 
goal or scenario based models contain domain characteristics; the i* framework, for 
example, contains basic modelling elements for representing the organisational 
domain, and the KAOS requirements modelling language is based on a meta-model, 
which identifies fundamental elements applicable to any problem domain, such as 
actions, events, entities, and agents.
2.1.6 Summary of Modelling Approaches
Although there is a plethora of ways to model requirements, many of these 
approaches are complementary, an aspect on which researchers have often focused, 
such as the integration of goals and scenarios. Goals are important to ensure the 
completeness of requirements. Scenarios help elicit, elaborate, and validate 
requirements. Modelling business processes and the organisational context provides 
the rationale for goals. The modelling of the problem domain provides us with the 
building blocks for formulating requirements without presuming a solution. The 
formalisation of a model enables us to automate checking to verify consistency and 
identify conflicts. Research in RE has focused mainly on functional requirements but 
is applicable to security requirements, and it is within this context that we now 
explore security requirements in more detail. Table 2.1 overleaf summarises the 
approaches we’ve reviewed.
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Paradigm Modelling Approach Summary of Approach
Goal Orientation
KAOS
(Dardenne et al., 1993)
Goals successively 
decomposed into 
operationalised 
requirements supported by 
a formal notation.
GBRAMS 
(Anton, 1996)
Method for eliciting and 
elaborating requirements 
from a goal hierarchy, 
using natural language to 
describe functions.
NFR Framework 
(Chung, 1991)
Semi-formal approach to 
elaborate non-functional 
requirements from goals, 
linking design decisions to 
goals.
Organisational Context
i* Framework
(Yu & Mylopoulus, 1994)
Requirements derived from 
the strategic intentions of 
actors and their 
dependencies. A structured 
approach with diagrams 
and textual descriptions.
Formal Tropos 
(Fuxman et al., 2001)
Formal version of the i* 
framework.
ORDIT
(Dobson etal., 1992)
Requirements derived from 
the responsibilities of users, 
semi-formal based on 
diagrams and textual 
descriptions.
Enterprise Modelling 
(Loucopoulus & Kavakli, 
1995)
This semi-formal approach 
combines the social 
perspective (actors, their 
roles and goals) with the 
technical perspective (flow 
of information and business 
processes) to derive 
requirements.
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Use Cases Semi-formal approach to 
describe scenarios.
Scenarios
Statecharts 
(Glinz, 1995)
Formal approach to 
describe scenarios using 
statecharts.
Message Sequence Charts 
(Uchitel et al., 2001)
Formal approach to 
describe scenarios using 
message sequence charts.
Trees
(Hsia et al., 1994)
Formal approach to 
describe scenarios using 
trees.
Schematic Scenario Analysis 
(Potts, 1995)
Structured method to derive 
goals from scenarios based 
on textual descriptions.
CREWS 
(Maiden, 1998)
Semi-formal approach to 
explore alternative 
scenarios generated from 
an abstract model.
Inferring Declarative 
Requirements from Scenarios 
(van Lamsweerde and 
Willemet, 1998)
Formal approach to identify 
goals from scenarios.
Domain
Problem Frames 
(Jackson, 2001)
Requirements derived by 
decomposing problems 
according to generic types 
of problems.
Domain Matching 
(Sutcliffe, 2000)
This approach identifies 
and matches requirements 
to generic types.
Finite State machine
Software Cost Reduction 
(Heitmeyer, 1998)
Models the behaviour of a 
system as a set of outputs 
expressed as a 
mathematical function of 
the state and history of the 
environment.
Table 2.1 Overview of Requirements Modelling Approaches
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2.2 Security Requirements
In this section we explore what security requirements are and highlight the 
significance of security requirements derived from the principles of management 
control.
2.2.1 The Source of Security Goals and Requirements
Security requirements are those requirements concerned with the protection of 
valuable assets. They stem from the top level security objectives of maintaining 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (ISO, 2005). These top level objectives give 
us an orientation. Confidentiality is concerned with maintaining privacy and secrecy, 
allowing read access to only those users who have been authorised. Integrity is about 
ensuring the accuracy and completeness of information, and involves allowing only 
authorised users to change or create data and applying controls to ensure the 
correctness of the data. Availability is concerned with ensuring that access to 
information systems is maintained when required. Closely related to security 
requirements are privacy requirements. Privacy requirements differ from security 
requirements in that they are associated with the protection of personal data, rather 
than data belonging to an organisation.
These high level security and privacy objectives express what we want to protect 
with regard to valuable assets, but need to be translated into security goals, and 
subsequently security requirements. Moffett et al. (2004) provide a perspective on the 
source of security goals and how they relate to security requirements. A goal is 
something that a stakeholder wishes to achieve or avoid. A security requirement is a 
constraint on a function required to achieve a security goal. Moffett et al. identify 
three sources of security goals:
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1. Harm to assets
2. Management control principles
3. Business goals
Harm to assets can occur when the system is misused, and a security objective is 
breached, such as the confidentiality or integrity of the asset, hence specific goals are 
derived to obviate these threats. Constraints also stem from the principles of 
management control that apply to all applications, and would otherwise be repeatedly 
derived. The third source are the business goals for specific applications, which 
determine what assets are at risk, and which principles of management control apply. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates these sources. Moffett et al. (2004) discuss policies, but restrict 
their discussion to access policies. Access policies are however derived from 
organisational requirements, as pointed out by Thomas & Sandhu (1994); Moffett et 
al. do not explain this derivation process.
Anton & Earp (2001) emphasise the need to align security and privacy 
requirements with a security policy. They describe a security policy as a document 
identifying security goals and assessing risks. Anton et al. (2001) use the term of 
meta-requirement to describe a policy. By this they mean that a policy is a 
requirement applicable to all systems within an organisation. Anton & Earp (2001), 
and subsequently Anton et al. (2001) propose the use of GBRAMS to systematically 
define security goals that constitute a security policy, and to ensure that security 
requirements in a system are aligned with the security policy. Unlike Moffett et al. 
they ignore the principles of management control.
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Harms
Elicited from Mandated byDerived from
Operationalises
Security Goals
Assets
Threats
Security
Requirements
Business Goals Management 
Control Principles
>
Dependency
Figure 2.1 Security Requirements Core Artefacts 
(adapted from Moffett et al., 2004)
Policies are expressed in natural language, and Breaux & Anton (2005) suggest 
they are more open to interpretation than goals expressed in a requirements 
specification. They have proposed a process to derive semantic models from goals 
extracted from privacy policy documents, which enables policies and goals to be 
compared more easily. This research builds on the approach proposed by Anton et al. 
but focuses on privacy policies rather than security, and hence does not explore 
policies derived from the principles of management control.
2.2.2 Deriving Security Requirements from Threats
Researchers have explored how some of the different modelling approaches that 
we reviewed in section 2.1 can be adapted to analyse threats, and so derive security 
requirements.
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Sindre & Opdahl (2000), and Sindre & Opdahl (2001) propose an approach to 
modelling threats, based on use cases, which they call “misuse cases”. A conventional 
use case diagram is extended by adding inverse cases, which model how malicious 
actors may perform harmful actions; having identified these threats, countermeasures 
can be defined. It is a systematic approach to modelling threats, though not formal, 
and analysis is subjective. It does however make the analyst think about each use 
case, and whether there is a scenario which could be harmful.
Alexander (2002) builds on this approach, but focuses more on the conflict 
resolution of goals. Alternative use case goals may mitigate or aggravate the threats 
posed by misuse cases, and Alexander proposes a notation to indicate this on use case 
diagrams. Although the resulting model shows where goals conflict, what this 
approach does not show is how goals aggravate or mitigate threats.
Van Lamsweerde et al. (2003) and van Lamsweerde (2004) propose KAOS to 
model threats and countermeasures. They model threats as ”anti-goals”, representing 
the malicious intent of agents as obstacles to security goals. Having discovered 
threats, further goals can then be defined to counteract the threats. This is a formal 
approach, which enables a more rigorous analysis to be carried out than with use 
cases.
Yu & Liu (2000) and Liu et al. (2003) show how a threats analysis can be carried 
out using the i* framework. The i* framework models the social intentions of actors. 
The authors show how actors can be modelled in attacking roles, and how attacks, 
modelled as goals, and their task dependencies, impact on the security goals of other 
actors. As with the other approaches, having identified attacks, countermeasure goals 
can then be added, in order to mitigate attacks. This is a very similar approach to the 
one proposed by Alexander, though the i* framework allows the definition of a more
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detailed model, where individual actors can be assigned multiple roles, and soft goals, 
tasks, resources, and their dependencies can also be modelled.
Lin et al. (2003) apply problem frames to bound the scope of a security problem. 
Their approach is to first of all scope the problem, identifying sub-problems. The next 
step is then to identify the security concerns of each sub-problem. Threats to the 
security concerns, which the authors refer to as “anti-requirements”, are then captured 
in the form of “abuse frames”. An abuse frame is a problem frame that models the 
threat to the system context showing the phenomena by which malicious users interact 
with the system. This analysis highlights vulnerabilities, which then can be used as a 
basis for improving the design. One of the key advantages of problem frame analysis 
is that recurring types of problems can be identified and described, however Lin et al. 
do not show how this would be applied or how it is advantageous for the analysis of 
abuse frames. They point out that some threats only become evident by recomposing 
sub-problems.
Haley et al. (2004) have explored how trust assumptions can be considered during 
an analysis. A trust assumption is a security property that a component, be it human or 
technical, must posses if a security requirement is to be satisfied. They illustrate using 
problem frames how trust assumptions can be assigned to components within the 
problem domain. Structured argumentation can be applied to verify that trust 
assumptions have been satisfied (Haley et al., 2005). It complements the research by 
Lin et al. (2004), focusing more on the design constraints that need to be satisfied to 
ensure that security requirements can be fulfilled.
All these approaches are systematic in their identification of possible attacks and 
the definition of countermeasures. They all involve an iterative process of defining 
security goals and identifying ways by which these goals can be obstructed or broken.
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However the process of identifying threats is still a creative process; it requires 
experience of what has happened in the past to invent scenarios. Unlike functional 
requirements, where stakeholders are on hand to express what they want from a 
system, malicious users are not on hand to express how they intend to attack the 
system. This is why it would be helpful to have a way of identifying recurring threats. 
This approach has been alluded to by Lin et al. (2004), but is an avenue of research 
that still needs to be pursued.
2.2.3 Deriving Security Requirements from Management Control Principles
In commercial organisations, there are established management control principles, 
which are applied to protect assets and prevent fraud (Moffett & Sloman, 1988). 
Accounting practices are a key source of these principles as Clark & Wilson (1987) 
have identified. For example double entry book-keeping entails that any transaction 
has two parts in two separate ledgers, where a transaction booked into one ledger is 
matched by a transaction booked out of another ledger. If a transaction in one book is 
not matched, as is checked during an audit, then this is either an error or fraud. The 
segregation of duties provides a further mechanism in that if it is ensured that 
matching transactions can not be entered by one individual, then fraud is less likely, 
as to commit fraud, collusion is necessary.
In fact the cause of the fraud at Barings Bank that we described in chapter 1, was a 
breakdown in the accounting procedures and segregation of duties. The perpetrator, 
Nick Leeson, was in charge of two separate areas in the bank, settlement and trading, 
which enabled him to hide unauthorised trades and so manipulate the books. It does 
illustrate how important it is to maintain these principles.
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There are other key principles from which access policies are derived. The 
minimum privileges principle requires users only have access to those resources that 
they need in order to be able to carry out their tasks (Anderson, 2001). Moffett & 
Lupu (1999) identify the delegation and revocation of authority, and supervision and 
review as two further principles.
Thomas & Sandhu (1994) view an organisation as a system that is required to 
preserve a certain level of integrity, and that there are organisational procedures and 
internal controls required to maintain this state. This integrity has also to be 
maintained in the organisation’s computer systems. They highlight that control 
principles are organisational requirements that ultimately translate into access control 
models to enforce these principles.
The way in which such controls can mitigate threats is illustrated by Anderson 
(1996). In describing a policy for medical records he highlights the fact that there 
would be much greater concern if several thousand GP receptionists could all access 
the medical records of any patient in the UK, than if each one could only access the 
records of patients in the practice in which they work. This is a good example of how 
the minimum privileges principle can be applied to mitigate the threat to the 
confidentiality of patient records.
The fact that management control principles are a key source of security goals and 
requirements means that we need to be able formulate goals and requirements that do 
satisfy these control principles. To a great extent they will be formulated as access 
policies. Recently research has started to focus on how requirements modelling 
approaches can be applied to defining them.
Fontaine (2001) has explored the mapping of agent assignment in KAOS to 
access policies in Ponder, a language for specifying access control policies in
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distributed systems. A significant problem here is that Fontaine does not differentiate 
between actual users or roles; i.e. that a physical individual can adopt several roles. 
An example where this is a problem is if we wish to define the segregation of duties, 
whereby we are interested in preventing a physical individual from performing two 
separate tasks. Fontaine does highlight the agent, and the agent’s assignment to 
actions as a key to the definition of access policies.
Bandara et al. (2004) have also explored deriving policies in Ponder from a 
KAOS goal model, however they focus specifically on the enforcement of sequences 
of operations to satisfy goals rather than agent assignments.
Liu et al. (2003) have explored how the minimum privileges principle can be 
modelled in the i* framework, using a strategic rationale (SR) model, which models 
the internal relationships within an actor with respect to the goals, tasks and resources; 
the goals, resources and tasks are contained within an actor boundary. They show how 
the actor boundary in the SR model can be used to define access restrictions, an 
example of which is shown in figure 2.2 adapted from their case study. They also 
demonstrate how the minimum privileges principle and segregation of duties policies 
can be translated from i* into the specification language Alloy, which can then be 
checked automatically using a tool.
The actor boundary in figure 2.2 shows the relationship between the family doctor 
and the internal actor goal of providing a regular clinical service, which is dependent 
on the task to open a new medical record, which in turn is dependent on the resource, 
medical record. Liu et al. propose that the actor boundary defines restrictions ensuring 
the principle of least privileges can be enforced. The family doctor is then restricted to 
the tasks and resources defined within its boundary. However there is an important 
aspect associated with the least privileges principle that can not easily be represented
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in i*; that is that the family doctor should only access medical records associated with 
his patients, otherwise he could access records associated with patients not assigned to 
him so violating the least privileges principle.
Family
Doctor
Open a New 
Medical Record
Medical
Record
Provide Regular 
Clinical Service
Figure 2.2 Strategic Rationale Diagram for a Medical Application 
(adapted from Liu et al., 2003)
Giorgini et al. (2005) demonstrate the modelling of delegation and trust in i* 
diagrams. The authors propose extensions to i* dependency diagrams, within the 
context of the Tropos methodology Giorgini et al. (2004), to represent trust between 
agents and delegation relationships. Their focus is in relating trust and delegation; i.e. 
identifying to what extent the delegator can trust the delegatee. Their definition of 
delegation is more general than that derived from the principles of management
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control, including delegation between agents not in the same organisation, such as a 
customer delegating to an organisation. Their approach however does not include 
identifying authority relationships, within an organisational domain. The importance 
of defining authority relationships is illustrated by the fraud at Barings Bank that we 
have already touched on; Nick Leeson abused his authority by delegating fraudulent 
tasks to his subordinates. Massaci & Zannone (2006) apply the approach proposed by 
Giorgini et al. to analyse a case study on the fraud committed by John Rusnak at the 
Allied Irish Bank. The key strength of this analysis is in detecting inconsistencies with 
regard to trust. However although they show the organisational context, there are 
certain key aspects that are not represented, for example the authority relationship 
between John Rusnak and his superior, and what responsibility he had.
He (2005) has proposed the Requirements-Based Access Control Analysis and 
Policy Specification (ReCAPS) method, which is a role engineering process for 
deriving roles that can be mapped onto an access control system, whereby a role is 
defined as a collection of permissions. It involves analysing tasks and the resources 
that need to be accessed as a result of carrying out these tasks, and defining roles as 
collections of permissions. A key strength of this approach is that it provides a 
systematic way of defining roles, and it links these definitions back to security goals. 
However, he does not explain how his approach relates to management control 
principles and how these principles maybe satisfied. Nevertheless the fact that roles 
are defined, which restrict access, gives us requirements satisfying the minimum 
privileges principle, but as with the other approaches described above, this would not 
be completely covered. He et al. (2006) present a case study using the ReCAPS 
method, where they give a role definition of an analyst in a software project, who can 
classify goals. But what they do not define is the scope; i.e. does an analyst classify
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goals for one project, or perhaps he can classify goals for all projects carried out by an 
IT development department? As we saw above for the medical record policy proposed 
by Anderson (1996), this domain oriented restriction is important.
Strens & Dobson (1993) propose how ORDIT can be applied to derive security 
requirements. The ORDIT modelling approach allows authority relationships between 
roles to be defined. As with the i* framework the authors make an explicit delineation 
between human users and the roles that they can adopt. In particular they focus on 
defining responsibilities; they differentiate between responsibilities and obligations. 
They describe a responsibility as a state of affairs, whereas an obligation is what an 
agent needs to do to discharge his responsibilities; i.e. the expectation of carrying out 
activities. Whereas obligations can be delegated, responsibility remains with the 
delegator, and hence there is a relationship between two agents, where one agent has a 
responsibility to ensure that a task is carried out and the second agent, the subordinate, 
executes the task. This modelling technique uses diagrams to describe roles, and their 
relationships. Its strength is in the modelling of delegation; however, the approach 
although structured is not underpinned by a formal model in the same way that KAOS 
or the i* framework is, and hence the semantics are imprecise, and no details are 
given as to how delegation can be reasoned about. Although the hierarchical 
relationships can be modelled, there is no link to the organisational structure, and 
hence definitions relating roles to organisational domains are missing.
Sutcliffe et al. (2006) apply domain matching and problem frame analysis to a 
telemedicine application, which includes access control, but they only focus on the 
access control mechanisms rather than the assignment of tasks to agents; i.e. how 
users are checked against authorisation lists, rather than which users should be given 
access.
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When we consider these contributions to modelling security requirements derived 
from management control principles, then we see that most of these principles have 
been explored, implicitly or explicitly, namely the principle of minimum privileges, 
segregation of duties, delegation, and supervision and review. But there still remains a 
problem, and that is the lack of a link to the organisational structure, organisational 
domains, and organisational functions. For example a restriction that a doctor can 
only access medical records of his patients, or a ward secretary register patients on a 
ward relate to the way that these obligations are delegated within the organisation, and 
these are not represented in the models that we reviewed above. As we have seen 
these restriction definitions are therefore incomplete in that they don’t include 
important aspects of the organisational context.
The principle of delegation and revocation of authority, as well as that of 
supervision and review are further principles that require an analysis of the 
organisational context as they depend on the hierarchical relationships within the 
organisation (Moffett & Lupu, 1999). There are also accounting principles, such as 
credit limits and double entry book keeping. Thomas & Sandhu (1994) illustrate how 
procedures can be modelled in the form of workflows, where actions need to be 
carried out in a predefined sequence, with certain actions requiring approval.
For the purposes of comparison of those approaches for which the definition of 
access policies has been explored, table 2.2 summarises the extent to which 
requirements have been derived from key management control principles. As we see 
from table 2.2, two principles have been explored as to how they can be achieved 
using existing approaches by defining access policies as the assignment of tasks and 
resources to actors, but with only partial success. For modelling all these principles 
the key is to link actors not only to tasks and resources, but also to the organisational
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context, and thereby lies the crux of the problem, that current modelling approaches 
do not easily allow this.
Management 
Control Principle
KAOS i* Framework ReCAPS ORDIT
Minimum Privileges 
Principle
partially partially partially partially
Segregation of Duties No partially no no
Delegation and 
Revocation of 
Authority
No partially no partially
Supervision and 
Review
No no no partially
Accounting Principles No no no no
Table 2.2 Coverage of Management Control Principles by Requirements 
Modelling Approaches
Modelling of the 
Organisational Context
KAOS i* Framework ReCAPS ORDIT
Agent Assignments to Tasks 
and Resources
yes yes yes yes
Separation of Roles to 
Agents
partially yes no yes
Organisational Domains no no no no
Organisational Functions no no no no
Authority Relationships no no no yes
Workflows no no no no
Table 2.3 Modelling of the Organisational Context in Requirements 
Modelling Approaches
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Table 2.3 demonstrates key characteristics of the organisational context that are 
important in modelling organisational principles. As we see in table 2.3, agent 
assignments to tasks and resources already exist in current models, and it this aspect 
that researchers have begun to explore to define the minimum privileges principle. 
The separation of roles and agents is necessary to model and analyse the segregation 
of duties. Organisational domains are required to ensure that we can define minimum 
privileges, and also determine the boundary within which authority can be exercised. 
The functions of the organisation determine which tasks need to be carried out. 
Authority relationships need to be represented as a prerequisite for modelling the 
principles of delegation, and supervision and review. Workflows are required to 
ensure that procedures can be modelled involving review, approval or satisfying 
accounting principles, such as only issuing cash orders for payment after the goods 
have been received.
To develop a framework to model the organisational context is the prime objective 
of this thesis, as this is a prerequisite for defining the security requirements that are 
derived from management control principles. We have selected the minimum 
privileges principle for investigation to demonstrate how our framework can improve 
on existing requirements modelling approaches. We have decided to extend the i* 
framework due to its focus on the social context. Organisations are social systems, 
and the i* framework’s capabilities with respect to modelling the dependencies 
between actors can be applied to this context.
2.3 Chapter Summary and Evaluation
In this chapter we began with a general review of requirements modelling; 
although there is a plethora of ways to model requirements, there are some basic
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paradigms common to these different approaches. The key aspects around which these 
paradigms are based include scenarios, goals, the organisational context, and the 
problem domain. These paradigms are not so much alternatives as complementary 
ways of viewing requirements, and indeed there has been research in to how to 
combine the strengths of different approaches; notable are the links between the 
organisational context and goals, as well as the complementary nature between 
abstract models, in particular goal-based models, and instantiated scenarios.
The chapter highlighted the nature of security requirements as being concerned 
with the protection of information assets. We identified three key sources of security 
requirements: the first source is from the analysis of threats; the second is from the 
business goals; the third being the principles of management control.
With respect to analysing threats to assets derived from business goals, 
researchers have explored a variety of existing modelling approaches. Threats are 
relatively straightforward to represent on models as obstacles to goals or anti­
requirements; more difficult is the creative process of identifying how a system can be 
compromised. A challenge that researchers are now facing is how to identify recurring 
threats, which would help automate the process.
Management control principles are the third key source, and this chapter 
highlighted that recent research into deriving security requirements from management 
control principles has focused on defining access restrictions to satisfy the minimum 
privileges principle.
This chapter has specifically motivated the need to define access policies that 
satisfy the principles of management control during requirements modelling. Various 
principles were identified including the minimum privileges principle, segregation of 
duties, delegation and revocation of authority, supervision and review, and accounting
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principles. The principle of minimum privileges has been selected for investigation as 
to how access policies can be defined to enforce them. The reason this principle has 
been selected is that it is fundamental, and other principles largely build on it; e.g., 
financial controlling and accounting principles. Furthermore the focus of the research 
is on, what the organisational literature refer to as, bureaucratic organisations, with 
role cultures, as it is organisations of this type that rely on formally defined 
procedures.
Chapter 3
The Organisational Context and 
Access Policies
In the last chapter we identified from the literature that there are security goals, 
and that they are derived from generic principles by which management control the 
actions of their subordinates. These security goals are satisfied by access policies that 
enforce these principles, for example, by ensuring that users only have access to 
resources they require to carry out the tasks delegated to them. Hence an access policy 
is a requirement that is derived from the principles of management control. In this 
chapter we explore this further. Firstly we review the organisational literature, which 
enables us to understand the principles by which organisations are structured, and how 
work is assigned within the organisation. Then we turn our attention to the security 
literature from which we gain insights into how access policies can be defined that 
satisfy these principles. What is of particular interest is how roles can be used as a 
basis for defining access policies, and how roles can be used to represent the 
organisational context.
This is very relevant to requirements modelling. As we saw in the last chapter, an 
access policy can be modelled from the assignment of an actor to tasks and resources, 
and an actor is in effect a role. We need to establish for each function in each system, 
who has access, and if we want to make sure that the policy is enforced, it entails an 
understanding of the organisation, and how tasks are assigned. Similarly, in order to
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ensure that supervision and review are adequately enforced, we need to understand the 
lines of authority within the organisation; i.e. who is in charge of who.
3.1 The Theory Underlying the Organisational Context
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the organisational context, it is useful to 
explore the organisational literature to understand the rationale of organisations, 
organisational structure, and the co-ordination mechanisms. It complements the 
security literature as it delves deeper into the nature of organisations.
3.1.1 Organisations and their Purpose
Groups of people can achieve far more than individuals working alone. 
Organisations can be considered as “social arrangements for the controlled 
performance of collective goals” (Buchanan & Huczinsky, 1985). Organisations are 
social systems with purposes as wide ranging from baby sitting circles to multi­
national chemical manufacturers. They vary widely from informal organisations, such 
as entrepreneurial start-ups to formal organisations, such as banks and government 
services.
The dilemma that organisations face is that the goals of individuals in an 
organisation can differ from the collective purpose of the organisation, such as when 
an individual commits fraud at the expense of the organisation. It is therefore 
necessary for organisations to exert control; this is the reason why organisations have 
a deliberate and ordered allocation of functions, and control the activities and 
interaction between organisational members. It is precisely these mechanisms that 
organisations also use to mitigate the actions of malicious employees.
The organisational structure, which is the fundament of management control, 
includes the allocation of formal responsibilities to interrelated groups and roles, it
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also includes linking mechanisms between roles and the co-ordinating structures of 
the organisation. A formal hierarchy of command is usually represented by an 
organisational chart.
3.1.2 Organisational Structures
In particular, large organisations are composed of organisational units that have 
clearly defined spheres of competence, however there are different ways in which 
spheres of competence can be allocated (Handy, 1985). Two principle ways in which 
organisations are divided, are horizontally and vertically, referred to as horizontal and 
vertical differentiation respectively.
Vertical differentiation refers to the division of work between management levels, 
with respect to the administrative tasks such as planning, co-ordination and control 
across different functional areas, whereas horizontal differentiation refers to the 
division of work according to factors such as function, geography, or personal 
qualification (Handy, 1985).
However considering horizontal differentiation, Mintzberg (1978) suggests that 
although there are a number of factors that have been identified on which horizontal 
differentiation can be based, they can be categorised into functional and market based 
characteristics.
Functional characteristics: In addition to the division of work on the basis of 
function, Mintzberg has identified qualification and work process as ways of dividing 
work, which are essentially a special form of function oriented differentiation.
Market characteristics: The other way of fundamentally dividing work is on the 
basis of market based characteristics. This can include organisational division based 
on customers, service, product, location, or time. In this case the functions are
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replicated but the difference being the market that the organisational division or unit is 
responsible for.
Often, particularly in large organisations, several of these characteristics are used. 
The National Health Service in the UK is divided into regional health authorities that, 
in turn, are composed of hospitals to serve the different population centres, so that the 
health authorities and hospitals are organised on a geographical basis. A hospital, 
however, is organised on a functional basis according to administration, the medical 
specialities, and supporting services. Similarly, retail banks have autonomous 
branches dispersed to serve local markets with a functional structure in each branch.
Another way in which an organisation can be structured according to multiple 
factors is through a matrix structure. In this case, each member of the organisation 
will belong to two groups. One group is responsible for the product or market, and the 
other has a functional responsibility. An example of this is in an engineering company 
undertaking projects. Each project consists of a multidisciplinary team of engineers, 
and each member of the team reports to the project manager, but there are also 
departments that carry responsibility for staff development, and maintaining standards 
in the different engineering disciplines.
This insight by Mintzberg has significant implications in modelling the 
requirements of access policies. We see this separation of functions and markets 
incorporated into security policies and frameworks. For example the principle of 
Chinese walls in financial institutions is based on preventing users from accessing 
data from clients who compete. Consultants are assigned sets of clients that represent 
markets, but carry out the same functions within their designated market segments. 
For the least privileges principle we need to take into account not only the functions 
that users can access, but also the market in which they operate. An example of this is
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given by Schaad (2003) whereby bank clerks in each branch of the bank would carry 
out identical functions but only for customers served by the particular branch to which 
they were assigned.
3.1.3 Organisational Control Principles: A Perspective from the Organisational 
Literature
To what extent can we generalise about the way in which a company exercises 
control? There is a stark difference between a small entrepreneurial company and a 
multi-national bank. Within any organisation there is a common set of beliefs and 
values with regard to the way in which authority is exercised; this is termed the 
culture (Handy, 1985).
Roger Harrison’s view on cultures provides a framework for analysis (Handy, 
1985). Many large organisations such as banks have a role culture, exemplified by 
control through rules and procedures, where a role or position is more important than 
the individual; in contrast small organisations usually have a power culture. The co­
ordinating mechanisms in a power culture are informal, and the organisation is 
flexible; there is little if anything in the way of formal procedures, and individuals are 
more important than roles. Another type of culture, found in organisations that run 
projects, is a task based culture. A matrix organisation is an example, where groups of 
specialists are formed to perform a particular task. Influence here is based on expert 
power rather than positional or personal power. Examples of this kind of culture can 
be found in IT development and investment banks.
These cultures are not mutually exclusive, as often different parts of an 
organisation will have different cultures. The strategic apex company may have a 
power culture, whereas the operational core could have a role culture, and in addition
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there is a continuum between a power and a role culture. As companies grow there are 
increasing pressures to formalise organisational structures, and introduce more rules 
and procedures.
Mintzberg (1992) also classifies organisations in a similar way, making a key 
distinction between simple informal structures common in small organisations and 
larger formalised bureaucracies. He also identifies the key co-ordinating mechanisms 
in the different types of organisations. In simple structures co-ordination is achieved 
through what Mintzberg terms as “mutual adjustment”; i.e. informal communication; 
as an organisation grows, it then begins to rely increasingly on supervision, and in
large organisations, rules and procedures become important.
Thus the principles of management control that we described in the previous 
section apply much more to large organisations, with a role culture, than small 
entrepreneurial organisations, however although there are classifications, it is not 
clear cut with a continuum between these cultures.
The focus in this thesis is on large organisations; i.e. a role culture, and how
computer systems can support the enforcement of rules and procedures.
3.2 Modelling Access Policies: A Security Perspective
In chapter 1, we highlighted two key research questions pursued in requirements 
engineering research (Lamsweerde, 2000b), which are what aspects to model, and 
how to model them. With respect to access policies, it is something researchers in 
security engineering have been exploring for many years. Their main focus has been 
in the development of policy languages and access control models having more to do 
with the implementation of security than the analysis of security requirements. 
However these access control models contain more than technical mechanisms, such
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as encryption, policy enforcement, and secure protocols, which in a requirements 
model only interest us as design decisions to satisfy a requirement. In developing 
policy languages, security researchers have found ways to express rules to restrict 
users, which ultimately need to be reflected in a requirements model. It is therefore 
relevant to review these languages and models. There are many policy languages and 
models, and it is not the objective of this thesis to provide a comprehensive review of 
them all; we focus on only those research contributions that have explored the 
organisational context, and show how they have successfully been able to model 
aspects of the organisational context.
3.2.1 Groups in the Definition of Access Policies
A common way of defining access policies is through the use of groups. Users 
have access to resources based on their membership of a group. Policy languages such 
as Ponder (Damianou et al., 2000) and ASL (Jajodia et al., 1997) allow us to define 
authorisations in this way; for example, the following is a language statement in 
Ponder:
+auth expermental_drugs 
subject /clinicians/consultants 
action prescribe_experimental_drugs 
targets /patients
It defines an action on a target domain on which the action can be carried out, and 
a subject; i.e. the group of users that are authorised to carry out an action. It describes 
a policy that states, consultant clinicians can only carry out the action to prescribe 
experimental drugs to patients. The plus sign indicates that this is a positive 
authorisation policy that allows access; in contrast, a negative policy denies access.
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This policy uses a subject domain. These subject domains are effectively instances 
that can be used to represent organisational groups, in the form of a hierarchy. Lupu et 
al. (2000) demonstrate this in a case study for a GSM mobile telecommunications 
enterprise, where the different organisational groups are defined as subject domains. 
In this geographically dispersed organisation, a subject domain is defined for each 
region, and the branches are modelled as sub-domains of their respective region. This 
reflects a division of work based on location, a form of division of work identified by 
Mintzberg that we reviewed previously.
Subject domains or groups are useful for representing policies on instances, and 
although it is appropriate to define instances of organisational groups in an 
implemented distributed policy management system, it is not useful in a requirements 
model. In a requirements model we do not really want to model hundreds of branches 
of a large organisation. It would be much more efficient to define an abstraction of a 
branch, which maps onto hundreds of branches.
3.2.2 Roles in the Definition of Access Policies
A way in which we can achieve this desired abstraction is through roles. 
Researchers in security have turned their attention to roles. Role-Based access control 
(RBAC) originally emerged from the software industry (Sandhu et al., 1996), as a 
convenient way for administrators to define access constraints. A role is a collection 
of permissions; it differs from a group, which is a collection of users. Although roles 
can be defined to reflect membership of a group (Sandhu et al., 2000), where a group 
is a set of instances of users, this focus on permissions rather than users gives us an 
ability to abstract about users and their access rights.
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Thus, in the previous example the consultant immunologist could be defined as a 
role instead of a subject, and then it is applicable throughout every hospital, as the role 
can then be instantiated for a specific subject and target domain. This principle is used 
in the Ponder policy language (Damianou et al., 2000). In Ponder a role is used to 
represent a position in an organisation (Lupu et al., 2000). A role is not tied to a 
specific group of users, it must be instantiated. A role definition such as this is 
therefore useful in a requirements model, though we somehow need to specify how it 
may be instantiated.
Roles give us a useful abstraction; but there is an interesting question as to what a 
role actually represents, and how roles relate to one another. In this thesis we are 
interested in representing roles in requirements models as a way of providing us with 
abstract policy definitions, it is therefore useful to review the security and 
organisational literature on roles, as it helps us to understand what we expect from a 
role definition.
Sandhu et al. (1996) propose relating roles in an inheritance hierarchy, their 
suggestion being that senior roles inherit permissions from junior roles; in this way an 
inheritance hierarchy could represent the organisational hierarchy. However the use of 
inheritance in this way will often be undesirable, as recognised by the authors 
themselves. A project manager, for example, may not have sufficient expertise to 
carry out specialised tasks that his subordinates have been assigned, hence it would 
not be desirable for him to be assigned these permissions.
Moffett (1998) describes however how an inheritance hierarchy can be useful. It is 
often possible to identify common responsibilities amongst members of an 
organisation. These responsibilities can be bundled together to form a generalised 
role. An example of this in a hospital, say, would be to define a generalised role of
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health care provider that provides permissions shared by both doctors and nurses. The 
role doctor is itself a generalised role for a physician or a surgeon.
In addition to a hierarchy based on inheritance, Moffett proposes two further 
hierarchies. The first is an activity hierarchy; in this hierarchy, permissions are 
bundled together to form a collection of permissions that are needed to carry out 
various tasks that logically belong together from an organisational standpoint. For 
example, a sequence of tasks may be required to provide a specific customer service, 
such as booking a flight. The second is a supervision hierarchy; this hierarchy is what 
is normally considered to be the organisational hierarchy in that it represents the lines 
of supervision showing the seniority of the members of staff. This is the hierarchy that 
can also be used to differentiate permissions between junior and senior members of 
staff.
This actually says something significant about the meaning of roles. In Moffett’s 
hierarchies there are roles based on the function of the individual, task, and seniority, 
each potentially part of a different hierarchy. In other words, different organisational 
characteristics/parameters are being captured in the form of roles, and the 
relationships between them.
Park et al. (2004) differentiate between organisational roles, system roles, and 
enterprise roles. Organisational roles represent positions in an organisation allowed to 
carry out the core activities; enterprise roles represent members of teams to perform a 
temporary task such as a project; and system roles represent supportive roles such as 
administrators. Each of these role types has its own hierarchy. These separate role 
hierarchies identified by Park et al. are similar to the classifications of different parts 
of the organisations as identified by Mintzberg (1978), who identifies the operational 
core and management as the main hierarchy, with separate authority structures for the
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“technostructure”; i.e. specialists maintaining the organisation’s operations 
infrastructure; and support functions.
Bacon et al. (2001) demonstrate how different types of roles based on function 
and seniority can be combined. In order to be assigned certain roles, a user must have 
been assigned other prerequisite roles, for example, a doctor can only be assigned the 
role of senior haematologist if the roles senior doctor and haematologist have already 
been assigned. Here the role senior haematologist is in effect a composition of the 
functional role haematologist, and the positional role senior doctor. Similarly a major 
European bank has defined positional and functional roles in its RBAC system 
(Schaad et al., 2001), where positional roles represent positions of authority, and 
functional roles the membership of functional groupings. Abdallah and Kayhat (2004) 
propose parameterising roles, where parameters can be used to represent different 
aspects of the organisational context, such as a level in the organisational hierarchy, or 
a department.
Other work in this area has identified how roles can relate to context. Bertino et al. 
(2000) describe how temporal constraints can be defined for roles, for example, when 
a role is activated for a shift, and then subsequently deactivated. In addition, an 
administrator can activate roles ad hoc. Covington et al. (2001) have explored 
applications for the home, and suggest how environmental roles could be useful. 
Access can be permitted based on environmental factors, such as location or time of 
day. Georgiadis et al. (2001) combine contextual information with team based access 
control. Team based roles identified by Thomas (1997) are useful for collaborative 
working environments, where users are assigned to teams and get access to the team’s 
resources. This can be combined with other contextual information, such as location 
or time intervals. Yao et al. (2001) present an access control model (OASIS), whereby
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users can activate roles, provided they satisfy prerequisite conditions, such as having 
an appropriate qualification, assigned function, task competence, or environmental 
constraint.
Researchers have also explored techniques for deriving roles. Role Engineering, 
as outlined by Coyne (1996 ), is a systematic process of identifying the activities of a 
single user and defining this as a role. Fernandez and Hawkins (1997) propose 
deriving roles from use case actor definitions, and Neumann and Strembeck (2002) 
propose deriving roles from scenarios of the work-process. All these approaches focus 
on deriving roles from tasks, and largely ignore the wider organisational context.
3.3 Relating Actors to the Organisational Context in Requirements 
Models
In the last chapter we reviewed some key contributions with regard to modelling 
access policies in requirements models. Having now additionally reviewed the 
literature on organisations and security, it is now useful to revisit and explore in more 
depth the problem we highlighted in chapter 2 with regard to access policy definitions 
using actors.
The actor or agent is a key to the definition of access policies. Access policies are 
restrictions on the user, and in requirements models agents or actors are used to 
represent human users. Actors or agents are generally synonymous with roles. Only in 
scenarios does it make sense to model a specific individual, in abstract models we use 
roles. In a library system, an example used to demonstrate KAOS (Dardenne et al., 
1993), two actors defined are the librarian and the borrower. Herein however lies a 
significant problem, and that is how do we define a role precisely? In the library 
system it maybe obvious, but this is not always the case, as He et al. (2006) in their
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approach to role engineering highlighted in applying their approach in practice. 
Certain assumptions maybe made about a role by a stakeholder that are not explicit in 
the name. Taking the example of the family doctor presented by Liu et al. that we 
reviewed in the previous chapter; maybe there are doctors of different seniority in the 
practice, and in describing what a family doctor can do, the stakeholder may 
implicitly be referring to a senior doctor, but unless this is raised by the analyst, this 
will be missed out. Terminology may also be important; for example is family doctor 
the only term we can use to describe this role? What about general practitioner, or just 
plain doctor? Would these be wrong or right?
The problem becomes clearer when we consult the literature on role theory 
(Biddle, 1979). A role is nothing more than expectation of some behaviour, and has as 
much to do with perception as a formal definition. What is this behaviour, and where 
do these expectations arise? The fact is that roles are social phenomena and as such do 
not have precise formal definitions. The problem is compounded by the fact that users 
will adopt multiple roles and vice-versa; furthermore individuals will interact with 
each other depending on the roles that they are adopting (Handy, 1985).
However languages specifically developed for specifying access policies, such as 
Ponder, can map the division of work in terms of subject and target domains, and the 
organisational hierarchy can be modelled as management structures. Thus in Ponder, 
for example, we can define policies that satisfy the principles of minimum privileges, 
as well as delegation and revocation of authority, whereas in requirements models, 
such as i* framework and KAOS, we can not. Researchers in security have also 
explored the problem of what roles are, Moffett and Lupu’s separation of concerns 
reduce the ambiguities that can occur in RBAC policy definitions.
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3.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we began with a review of the organisational literature. 
Organisations vary but we can generalise about organisational structure; in particular 
organisational groupings are based around functional and marketing characteristics. 
An important way in which organisations vary is through culture, ranging from 
informal structures to larger more formal structures where work is governed by 
procedures. These principles provide a reference point for identifying modelling 
concepts.
We reviewed access control frameworks, and in particular the concepts used in 
policy languages. Groups are a key way in which policies are formulated, and which 
map onto the groups of an organisation; however groups themselves are inadequate 
for defining requirements, as they are based on instances, and hence entail defining 
policies for every group in the organisation. Roles can provide a useful abstraction, 
and the research in security has demonstrated how they can be used to relate users to 
the organisational context, separating the concerns of authority and function.
We then revisited the problem of using actor definitions in current requirements 
models as a basis for defining access policies. We observed that an actor is in effect a 
role, but in contrast to policy frameworks, requirements modelling frameworks do not 
have an adequate link to the organisational context. A role is a social phenomenon 
open to interpretation, and requirements modelling approaches do not offer us a way 
of ensuring that the actor’s role definition is precise. In policy frameworks such as 
Ponder, roles and subjects are directly derived from the organisational context, and 
thus it is possible to define policies that are based on management control principles 
such as the minimum privileges principle and delegation.
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There is a need to define the organisational context, to which we need to link to 
actor definitions, and to identify concepts with which we can model this 
organisational context. It is the organisational context, which potentially provides a 
framework of reference to clearly identify the obligations assigned to a specific user, 
and the authority that he can exercise.
Chapter 4
The i* Framework and Formal 
Tropos
One of our research objectives is to extend an existing requirements modelling 
approach. In this chapter we review in more detail the i* framework, a requirements 
modelling approach that we extend in chapter 6. In chapter 2 we reviewed different 
approaches to modelling. We identified different paradigms; including goal based 
approaches, approaches around the organisational context, and scenarios. In particular 
we identified a class of requirements modelling approaches, which are based on the 
organisational context. Of these approaches we selected the i* framework for 
extension as it has advantages over other approaches; it is supported by a formal 
model and tools for representing and analysing models.
Originally devised as an early approach to requirements analysis to explore 
alternatives in the early phases of requirements analysis, as we mentioned in chapter 
2, it has recently become incorporated into the Tropos methodology. The Tropos 
methodology covers early and late requirements analysis, as well as architectural and 
detailed design. However we are really only interested in the early requirements phase 
and the i* framework, as we are focusing on the specification of requirements of 
access policies. The i* framework is a semi-formal approach to requirements analysis 
based on the use of diagrams to model requirements; recently, however, the i* 
framework has been formalised in the Tropos methodology and is known as formal
- 64 -
Chapter 4 The i* Framework and Formal Tropos
Tropos. The formalisation of the i* framework is particularly interesting as we can 
reason about it.
In this chapter we first of all review the i* modelling language in more detail, and 
then the formal version of the i* framework, formal Tropos.
4.1 Introduction to a Case Study: A Software Project
To illustrate the i* framework and formal Tropos we use a case study. This case 
study is based on an example in the literature (Sandhu et al., 1996) and the author’s 
own experience. It concerns a software project, and access to the project resources, 
relating the roles of project manager, programmer, and test engineer.
4.2 The i* Framework
The i* framework, which we reviewed in chapters 2 enables us to model 
dependencies, which is done at two levels.
Project
Plan
Communicate
Problems
Project
Manager
Programmer
Deliver
Software
Implement Software 
Requirement
Figure 4.1 i* Framework Strategic Dependency Diagram
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Resource Dependency
Soft Goal Dependency
■o— Goal Dependency
■ o - Task Dependency
Actor
Agent
Role
Position
Figure 4.2 i* Framework Symbols in Strategic Dependency Diagrams
The first level is modelled as a Strategic Dependency (SD) diagram, as shown in 
figure 4.1. The meanings of the symbols are shown below in figure 4.2. The SD 
diagram models how actors depend on one another, to carry out tasks, provide 
resources or fulfil goals.
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An actor can actually be an agent, role or position, where an agent is a physical 
entity such as a human, a role is defined as an abstract actor that can be adopted by a 
physical agent, such as conducting a task, and a position represents a set of roles that 
can be assigned to an agent. So for example we could define Jim Smith as an agent, 
who is as an instance of the agent Qualified Software Engineer representing a person 
with the capability to program, and who occupies the position of Programmer, and a 
couple of roles associated with the position of Programmer, such as Implement 
Requirement, and Write Code. This is represented in figure 4.3.
Occupies
ProgrammerINS Qualified
Software
Engineer
Jim Smith
Write
Code
CoversPart
Implement
Requirement
Figure 4.3 i* Framework Actors
At another level is a Strategic Rationale (SR) diagram, which explores a single 
actor, modelling the internal relationships within an actor, an example of which is 
shown in figure 4.4. This diagram shows an actor’s boundary, and a goal internal to 
the actor Programmer to achieve the goal of providing Software, which is dependent 
on carrying out the task of Writing Code. This task depends on the resource Program 
Module. In chapter 2 we described how the actor boundary as proposed by Liu et al. 
(2003) can be used to define a policy, where the actor has the right to perform tasks 
and access resources defined within the boundary.
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Programmer
Develop
Softwarez
Write Code
Program
Module
The symbols have the following meaning:
Actor boundary
Task Decomposition Link
Means-End Link
Resource
Goal
Task
Figure 4.4 i* Framework Strategic Rationale Diagram
In representing an access policy this diagram exhibits a similar weakness to the 
diagram we reviewed in chapter 2 of the access policy for a family doctor. This policy 
describes the access to the resource of a Program Module, to perform the task Write
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Code, but this restriction is only complete when it includes the organisational context 
of Project, which is not represented on this diagram. A programmer should not be able 
to access program modules of any project.
4.3 Formal Tropos
The use of formal Tropos in order to extend the i* modelling language has been 
proposed by Fuxman et al. (2001). The key motivation for the extensions to the i* 
framework is to utilise the advantage of formal methods in order to perform reasoning 
on requirements models, and hence verify the properties of a model and identify 
inconsistencies.
Formal Tropos describes the relevant objects of the modelled domain and has two 
layers. The outer layer models the objects as classes, whereby a class can be an actor, 
dependency or entity. Entities do not exist in the i* framework and are used to 
represent elements that do not appear in the model as they are not directly related to 
the actors’ strategic goals. Attributes in the class definitions represent relationships 
between classes. The intentional relationships between actors are represented as 
dependencies, which can be goals, soft-goals, tasks or resources. The inner layer of 
the formal Tropos language is identical to the inner layer used in the KAOS 
framework, which is a first order predicate language with temporal constraints. The 
following standard first order predicate and logical operators are used:
V for all, 3 there exists, => implies, a  and, v or, <=> equivalent, -> not
Examples of the temporal operators are as follows:
0 at some time in the future ♦ at some point in the past
o in the next state •  in the previous state
□ always in the future ■ always in the past
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0 <d sometime in the future within deadline d 
□ <d always in the future up to deadline d
The inner layer of Tropos is used to define constraints on the class definitions. 
First order logic quantifiers V and 3 can be used to range over all instances of a class;
in addition each instance of a class may express properties about itself using the 
operator self.
In addition to class definitions, Tropos provides formulae that describe properties
of the system as a whole. There are system invariants that hold in all states of the
system, there are system assertions that hold on all executions, and there are system
possibilities that hold on some possible behaviours of the system.
To demonstrate formal Tropos we have translated a part of the i* dependency and
strategic rational diagrams above as follows:
Entity Software Requirement 
Attribute approved: Boolean 
Attribute submitted: Boolean 
Attribute constant pm: Program Module 
Entity Program Module 
Attribute completed: Boolean
Actor Programmer 
Goal Develop Software 
Mode Achieve 
Fulfilment definition:
Visr: Implement Software Requirement, 
isr.depender = self => 0 isr.sr.pm.completed
Actor Project Manager 
Goal Manage Project 
Mode Achieve 
Fulfilment definition:
Visr: Implement Software Requirement, 
isr.dependee = self => 0 isr.sr.pm.completed
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Dependency Implement Software Requirement 
Type Goal 
Mode Achieve 
Depender Programmer 
Dependee Project Manager 
Attribute sr: Software Requirement 
Creation 
trigger sr.submitted 
condition sr.approved 
Fulfilment 
condition for depender sr.pm.completed
In order to define the formal specification we have defined Software Requirement 
and Program Module entities. The entity Software Requirement has boolean 
attributes, approved and submitted to represent the states. The third attribute pm 
relates a Software Requirement to a Program Module. The keyword constant means 
that an association between a Software Requirement and a Program Module can not 
be changed.
We have defined the goal dependency Implement Software Requirement between 
the dependee, Project Manager, and the depender, Programmer. This has a modality 
of achieve. That means this goal needs to be satisfied once. The other modalities are 
avoid, which is a goal to prevent a specified condition from occurring, maintain is a 
goal that continuously has to be satisfied, and maintain and achieve, which is a goal 
that has fulfilment conditions that continuously need to be satisfied.
The goal dependency in the example above has a creation condition, which is a 
constraint imposed when a dependency is created. In this example the software 
requirement must have been approved. There is also a creation trigger, which 
represents the condition that will cause the dependency to be generated. In this case 
this occurs when a sofware requirement is submitted. Fulfilment definitions are 
constraints that define conditions for the satisfaction of a dependency. In this example
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this is achieved when the depender, the programmer, has completed the the program 
module associated with the implementation of the software requirement.
In the example we have also defined a goal, Manage Project, associated with the 
project manager. This goal has a fulfilment condition that states, for all dependencies 
of type Implement Software Requirement for which the project manager is the 
dependee, the program module associated with the software requirement must be 
completed at some time in the future. A second goal, Develop Software, has been 
associated to the programmer; this is almost identical to the previous goal defined for 
the project manager, except that the programmer is the dependor.
It should be noted that there are number of features in the i* framework which 
have not been incorporated into formal Tropos. The differentiation between the 
different types of actors, (position, role and agent), have not been included. Formal 
Tropos does not currently support the modelling of SR diagrams; i.e. means-end 
relationships and task decomposition links that exist between tasks and the other 
elements of the framework. This means that currently access policies, as proposed by 
Liu et al. (2003), can not be defined using formal Tropos.
4.4 Formal Analysis in Tropos
A tool has been developed for analysing specifications in Tropos. The tool can 
analyse all possible executions of the system. It checks that assertions and possibility 
formulae are enforced, it does this by looking for counter examples. If a counter 
example is found it is reported.
For example in the model above we can define an assertion, that a progam module 
should not be completed if the software requirement has not been approved, which 
would be specified as follows:
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Dependency Implement Software Requirement 
Fulfilment 
assertion condition for dependee
sr.pm.completed => sr.approved
This assertion is satisfied due to the constraint in the creation condition.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have reviewed the i* framework and formal Tropos, 
highlighting the weakness of defining access policies in an i* model through a case 
study. We first gave an overview of the two types of dependency diagrams that exist 
in the i* framework: SD diagrams and SR diagrams. We then reviewed formal 
Tropos, a formal specification language to represent i* models. We highlighted the 
fact that formal Tropos does not currently allow us to represent SR models. We then 
reviewed how analysis in formal Tropos is supported by a tool.
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This chapter describes our framework for modelling access policies. This 
framework consists of a meta-model that describes domain independent abstractions, 
and how they relate to one another. These abstractions allow us to represent the 
organisational context, and to model how users relate to the organisation. It includes a 
set of constructs for modelling policies and defining scenarios. In particular, we 
present policy constructs that enable us to define restrictions that satisfy the principle 
of minimum privileges. Invariants allow us to check the correctness of domain 
definitions, and to check that scenarios are consistent with policy definitions.
We first introduce a case study. In section 5.2 we justify and introduce the Z 
notation we have used to develop the framework. In section 5.3 we then describe the 
rationale of the framework; i.e. the principles for defining the organisational context 
with an explanation of the organisational domain abstractions, and how we relate 
them to users and define policies. In section 5.4 we present the meta-model, 
comprising meta-concepts and relations between the meta-concepts, and the 
constructs that enable us to define policies and scenarios. In section 5.5 we present the 
heuristics for defining and verifying policies. We present these heuristics as a set of 
steps that could be used as a basis for a method, using the case study as an example. 
We conclude with a chapter summary.
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5.1 Introduction to a Case Study in the Medical Domain
The presentation of the framework in this chapter is illustrated through a case 
study in the medical domain, concerning the minimum privileges policy for access to 
medical and nursing records. It is based on discussions with medical and nursing staff 
who have worked in hospitals. The hospital and members of staff that we use in this 
example are hypothetical.
5.2 Framework Modelling Notation
5.2.1 Review of Formal Notations
In developing the meta-model for the framework, a language is required to express 
and reason about it. An important selection criterion is the degree of formality of the 
language. Requirements can be expressed using formal specification languages, semi- 
formal approaches, or informal representations (Jarke et al., 1993). The purpose of 
our framework is to define what meta-concepts we require to represent policies, and 
how the constructs can be formulated. Formal notations provide us with the key 
advantage of precise and unambiguous representation. Another objective of our 
research is to reason about our models. In particular we want to be able to verify the 
consistency of scenarios with policies. Formal notation enables us to do this more 
easily.
There are however many different formal notations to choose from (Clarke & 
Wing, 1996; van Lamsweerde, 2000a). In this research we are primarily concerned 
with defining restrictions to maintain a secure state. There are a number of languages 
that are based on the paradigm of defining admissible states; these include Z, VDM 
and B (van Lamsweerde, 2000a), and their variants (Buchi, 1998). They enable us to
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define invariants constraining the system at any point in time. The languages are very 
similar; for example, B was derived from Z (Carnot et al., 1992). Z however does 
differ from VDM and B in that invariants can be defined that apply to an entire 
schema, which means that preconditions in Z are implicit. In contrast, in VDM (Jones, 
1990) and B (Carnot et al., 1992), the preconditions need to be explicitly defined for 
functions. This is one of several aspects why VDM and B are more akin to 
conventional programming languages, and hence why refinement into code is easier 
with these languages. Indeed one of the motivations for B was improved refinement 
into code, and hence programming constructs were added to the mathematical 
notation. We, however, are interested in defining the properties of a framework, and 
the nature of Z as a pure specification language (Buchi, 1998), with a purer 
mathematical notation, is therefore more appropriate.
5.2.2 Z Notation
We only use a subset of the Z languauge, which we now introduce. A
comprehensive description of the Z notation is given by Spivey (1992).
[A] basic type definition; A is a basic type.
a: A variable definition; this introduces the variable a of type A.
C = [ a: A; b: B ] definition of a composite type; C is composed of two
components, a and b of types A and B respectively.
c.a selection operator for a composite type; given a variable c of
type C, c.a selects the component a.
A a  B conjunction operator; this expression is true if both A and B are
true.
A v B disjunction operator; this expression is true if either A or B is
true.
A => B implies; if A is true then B is also true.
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A = B 
A* B  
Va: A . B 
3a: A . B 
3a: A • B 
{a, b, c}
a g A
A c  B
0
A ~ B
A ^ B
A- » B
a b 
dom R
ran R
R+
equality; A equals B.
negation of equality; A is not equal to B.
universal quantifier; for all a in A, B is true.
existential quantifier; for some a in A, B is true.
negation of the existential quantifier; for no a in A, is B true.
set declaration; this declares a set containing the members, a, b, 
and c.
set membership; a is a member of A. 
subset; A is a subset of B or equivalent.
empty set symbol; this represents a set that contains no 
elements.
binary relation; this represents a set of relations between a set of 
type A, the domain, and a set of type B, the range.
function; this represents a set of relations between a set of type 
A, and a set of type B. Each member of A relates to one member 
in B.
partial function; this represents a set of relations between a set 
of type A and a set of type B. Each member of A relates at most 
to one member in B; i.e there may be members of A that do not 
relate to members of B.
maplet; this represents an element in a relation, denoting that a 
relates to b.
domain of a relation; this denotes the set of all the elements in 
the domain of a relation. If the set R relates X to Y, the domain 
is X.
range of a relation; this denotes the set of all the elements in the 
range of a relation. If the set R relates X to Y, the range is Y.
transitive closure of a relation; if R is a relation that relates 
elements of the same type, and contains x y and y »-» z, then 
R+ contains R and all indirect relations; i.e. x z.
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R* reflexive transitive closure of a relation; if R is a relation that
relates elements of the same type, then R* contains R+ and in 
addition relates all members of X to themselves i.e.; x ^  x.
R ( A ) relational image; this represents a subset of the range of the
relation R. This subset contains those members of the range of 
R, which are mapped to members of the domain in R contained 
in the set A; i.e. A is a restriction on the domain of R.
5.3 Rationale of the Framework
Before formally defining our framework, we first explain its rationale; i.e. what is 
it that the framework is to achieve, and the reason for the choice of meta-concepts. 
Our framework has been developed to focus on policies that ensure compliance with 
the principle of minimum privileges. The selection of the minimum privileges 
principle as a focus of the research was justified in chapter 2.
The meta-model of our framework allows us to define organisational policies, 
whereby a policy in this meta-model is an assignment of a task to a role. This 
assignment of a task to a role reflects the assignment of an obligation to a member of 
the organisation by its management to carry out an activity. As we reviewed in 
chapter 3, large organisations have formal structures, activities are assigned to roles 
rather than specific individuals. Which ever individual adopts the role will then 
assume the obligation to execute duties associated with that role, and therefore will 
need access to resources associated with those duties. The principle of minimum 
privileges states that individuals must only have access to resources they require to 
execute their duties. Hence a set of policies satisfying this principle will define 
precisely which tasks on which assets will be executed by which roles.
Whereas tasks and assets are unambiguous, and as we reviewed in chapter 2, their 
definition is subject to analysis techniques that are well established, the definition of
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roles is problematic due to the fact that roles are subjective social phenomena. In 
order to solve this problem the framework relates roles to the organisational context.
In chapter 3 we identified two key dimensions by which organisations are 
structured, along the lines of authority, and according to the division of work, and the 
fact that the division of work is based on a mixture of functional and market 
characteristics. The organisation is composed of groups each assigned a function and 
market with a hierarchical structure. The key therefore to defining a role precisely is 
to link a role definition to the function, an organisational domain for the market, and 
the level of authority. We can illustrate this with an example of a hospital.
Within a hospital two key functions are medicine, the function performed by 
doctors, and nursing, performed by nurses. These represent two key functional groups 
within the hospital. Nurses are assigned to wards, which effectively represent a 
division of work based on markets, where the patients in a ward represent the market 
being served by the nurses, and would be represented as an organisational domain in 
our framework. Doctors are formed into groups led by consultants, and each 
consultant carries responsibility for patients referred to him. Thus patients referred to 
the consultant represent the market served by the consultant, and his subordinates 
within the organisational domain of the consultants group. Within these groups are 
seniority levels, such as the consultant, who manages registrars, and within the 
nursing function a ward sister is in charge of staff nurses on the ward. So in this 
example we can define the role of consultant medical specialist, which has a function 
of medicine, an organisational domain of consultant group, and authority level of 
consultant, and a further role of senior ward nurse that has a function of nurse, an 
organisational domain of ward, and authority level of sister.
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Using these roles we can then define policies, as we described above, by assigning 
them to tasks. So we can define the task, read medical record, which has an asset 
dependency of medical record, and the policy is then defined as an assignment of the 
role consultant medical specialist to the task, read medical record. The policy allows a 
consultant to read medical records of patients referred to him; i.e. those medical 
records of his referred patients are assigned to the same organisational domain.
5.4 Framework Meta-Model
5.4.1 Metal-Model Overview
The framework consists of a meta-model that describes domain independent 
abstractions, which we refer to as meta-concepts, and how they relate to one another. 
Policies are defined using domain concepts by instantiating the meta-concepts. 
Examples of meta-concepts include role, and organisational function. An example of a 
domain concept is a consultant medical specialist, which is an instantiation of the 
meta-concept role. A policy is verified by instantiating domain concepts, and 
checking whether the policy is consistent with that instantiation. For example, 
Greenfield Hospital is an instantiation of the organisational domain, hospital.
5.4.2 Metal-Concepts
We now introduce the formal definitions of the meta-concepts. Since policies 
define restrictions on access to valuable information assets, and such access is 
required to carry out tasks, we need the meta-concepts of asset and task:
[Asset] An asset represents a resource that we wish to protect.
[Task] A task represents the activity that an organisational unit or individual carries 
out.
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In order to describe restrictions with respect to individuals, we also need the meta­
concepts of agent and role:
[Agent] An agent represents a physical person.
[Role] A role represents an assignment of an obligation, of performing some function, 
which is a composite element representing the organisational function, organisational 
domain, and authority.
As we need to link a role to the macro-organisational context, we also need some 
additional meta-concepts:
[Org_Function] An organisational function represents a functional grouping within an 
organisation. Members of a functional grouping will be expected to carry out tasks 
that will be assigned to this group.
[Org_Domain] An organisational domain represents a market based grouping; i.e. a 
grouping that is assigned a market to serve, such as a set of clients in a specific 
geographic location. An example of this would be a hospital, which serves patients in 
its locality.
[Authority] A level of authority represents the seniority of a role.
The meta-concept role as described above is a composite of authority, 
organisational function, and organisational domain, and is defined formally as 
follows:
Role = [ authority: Authority; org_function: Org_Function; org_domain: Org_Domain ]
A key decision in defining this meta-model was to define a role as a composite 
element representing the organisational function, organisational domain, and 
authority. As we reviewed in chapter 3, a role can have many meanings, it is indeed 
anything that conveys behaviour, which can lead to ambiguous definitions. Defining a 
role as a composition of organisational elements removes this ambiguity. It provides a
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precise link to the organisational context. These organisational elements are defined, 
so that they can be derived from the organisational structure.
Organisational functions are derived from groupings based on function; 
organisational domains are derived from groupings based on marketing 
characteristics, and authority based on the hierarchical relationships within these 
groups. Referring to the example introduced earlier, in a hospital, the two key 
organisational functions are nursing and medicine. The organisational domain 
represents the grouping based on market characteristics, in this case the hospital that 
serves a local community, which itself is part of a regional health authority. The 
hospital is divided into wards, which are organisational domains to which nurses are 
assigned.
5.4.3 Inheritance and Aggregation Hierarchies
We have also introduced inheritance hierarchies for organisational functions, and 
aggregation hierarchies for organisational domains and tasks. The inheritance 
hierarchy for organisational functions was introduced to model the characteristic that 
groups are often structured according to an increasing level of specialisation. Thus the 
medical specialists of a hospital are divided into physicians and surgeons, which are 
in turn divided into groups with a further level of specialisation, such as cardiologists 
or haematologists. The inheritance property allows us to model common 
characteristics of medical specialists. This is useful when we define policies. For 
example all medical specialists keep medical records, so we can define a policy for 
medical staff, without the necessity to define a policy that is repeated for each 
speciality. Since policies are defined on roles, the inheritance relationship also exists 
between roles, where if a role inherits from another a role it has the same
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organisational domain, and authority, but different organisational functions that are 
themselves related through inheritance.
The inheritance between organisational functions is formally defined as follows: 
inhf: Org_Function Org_Function
The inheritance of roles is represented by the following function: 
inhr: Role - »  Role
The domain role inherits from the range role, and likewise for organisational 
functions.
Formally, to determine whether a role inherits from another, we need a relational 
image on a transitive closure. So, to specify the condition that a role, role2, is 
inherited by rolel we can write: 
role2 e inhr+( {rolel})
If a role has an organisational function that is inherited from an organisational 
function of another role, and these two roles have an identical organisational domain 
and level of authority, then there exists likewise an inheritance relationship between 
the two roles.
The aggregation hierarchy for organisational domains allows us to model an 
organisational structure based on marketing characteristics. This enables us to capture 
the division of work based on markets (Mintzberg, 1992). As we described above, 
hospitals have wards each representing an organisational domain, and the hospital is 
itself an organisational domain. Thus if we define a policy for a hospital manager to 
access staff records, then this allows him to access records within each ward. This 
aggregation hierarchy allows us to define this property. Formally this is expressed as: 
aggd: Org_domain Org_Domain
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This function has the aggregated organisational domain as the range.
There are a number of constraints related to these relationships that are useful, to 
ensure consistency. Organisational functions and roles can not inherit themselves, 
similarly an organisational domain can not be an aggregation of itself. These three 
constraints are defined respectively as follows:
Vof: org_function • of e inhf ( {of}) defines an organisational function can not inherit 
itself.
Vr: role . r g inhr+ ( {r}) defines a role can not inherit itself.
Vod: org_domain • od e  aggd+ ( {od}) defines an organisational domain can not be an 
aggregation of itself.
The following invariant states that a role, role2, that is inherited by rolel must 
have an organisational function that is inherited by the organisational function 
assigned to rolel, and must have an identical level of authority and organisational 
domain.
Vrolel; role2: role • role2 e inhr+( {rolel}) => role2.org_function e 
inhf ( {rolel.org_function}) a  role2.org_domain = rolel.org_domain a  
role2.authority = rolel.authority
5.4.4 Levels of Authority
The meta-concept Authority, as part of a role, represents the seniority of that role. 
If we want to represent the organisational hierarchy as proposed by Moffett & Lupu, 
(1999), then we need to identify the hierarchical relationships between roles that 
represent the lines of authority. In fact for the purposes of modelling minimum 
privileges we do not need to represent the hierarchy; however, we do need to 
represent it if we are to extend our framework to model other principles, such as
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delegation. So, in order to capture the lines of authority, we introduce the function 
senior, which models the seniority as follows: 
senior: Authority Authority
The function senior maps junior levels of authority to senior levels; i.e. a junior 
level can at most map to one senior level in a single organisational domain. In matrix 
or project based organisations an individual can be assigned to more than one group 
(Handy, 1985), and hence report to more than one superior. This can potentially be 
represented in this framework by assigning an agent multiple roles in different 
organisational domains.
There is one constraint that we have defined with respect to seniority 
relationships, and that is that a level of authority can not be senior to itself. This is 
defined as follows:
Va: Authority • a g senior+ ( {a})
5.4.5 Organisational Assets and Tasks
Tasks can often be subdivided. It is important to model this, because if a task is 
assigned to an individual, then this will entail carrying out all its constituent subtasks. 
This subdivision can be represented as an aggregation hierarchy for tasks, which 
enables us to define a policy for a composite task. Formally the task aggregation is 
defined as follows: 
aggt: Task <-» Task
Sub-tasks are defined as the range.
Tasks can be divided down to the lowest level of granularity, to the point at which 
they represent a single action, where the action can be assigned to an asset or group of 
assets. Tasks at the lowest level in the aggregation hierarchy can be mapped onto
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actions or tasks in existing requirements models. The relationship between tasks and 
assets is represented by a task asset dependency relationship: 
task_asset_dependency: Task «-> Asset
Assets belong to organisational domains. This reflects the subdivision of work 
based on marketing characteristics. We represent this as: 
asset_domain: Asset —> Org_Domain
There is a constraint that we have defined with respect to task aggregation and that 
is that a task can not be aggregated by itself:
Vt: Task • t e  aggt+ ( {t})
5.4.6 Policy Definitions
We define policies using the following composite type:
Authorisation_Policy = [ role: Role; task: Task ]
Within this policy, there are two implicit assumptions: firstly, the policy applies to 
any subtasks of the task in the policy; and secondly, the organisational domain in the 
role of the policy applies to all assets associated with the task through the relation: 
task_asset_dependency: Task <-» Asset
5.4.7 Policy Verification
We now explain how our meta-model can be used to verify that an instantiation is 
consistent with a policy specification.
First, we create an instantiation, which in effect is a simple scenario of an agent 
executing a task. In creating this scenario, not all domain concepts can be instantiated. 
The level of authority and the organisational function are constants. For example, if 
we define an organisational function of nursing, then this organisational function will
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not change for the instantiation. Instantiations are required of organisational domains, 
roles, tasks, assets, and agents. We decided to use instantiation relationships between 
elements of the same type, which is an approach adopted in current requirements 
modelling frameworks such as the i* framework and KAOS. We initially explored 
using separate types for instantiated elements, and found that this added unnecessary 
complexity; in any case we need instantiation relationships, and this alone allows us 
to differentiate between domain definitions and instantiated elements.
An organisational domain instantiation will represent a specific organisational 
unit. For example, a hospital has wards, a ward is a domain description of an 
organisational unit, but ward A is an instantiation. Since an organisational domain is a 
composite part of a role, roles also need to be instantiated. So, if we define a nurse as 
an abstract role, then an instantiation of this would be a nurse in ward A.
The instantiation of organisational domains is defined formally as follows: 
insd: Org_Domain Org_Domain
Where the domain Org_Domain is instantiated from the range.
The instantiation for roles, tasks and assets are defined likewise, respectively as 
follows:
insr: Role Role
inst: Task Task
insa: Asset Asset
To ensure consistency we have defined the following constraints on these three 
relationships, which define that an instantiated organisational domain, role, task or 
asset can not be instantiated from an organisational domain, role, task, or asset 
respectively, that itself is an instantiation.
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Vod1; od2: Org_Domain . od2 e  insd ( {od1}) => insd ( {od2}) = 0  
Vr1; r2: Role . r2 e insr ( {r1}) => insr ( {r2}) = 0
Vt1; t2: Task • t2 e inst ( {t1}) => inst ( {t2}) = 0
Va1; a2: Asset • a2 e  insa ( {a1}) => insa ( {a2}) = 0
A further constraint is that an abstract role not be associated with an instantiated 
organisational domain, and also that an instantiated role not be associated with an 
abstract organisational domain. We recognise an abstract role if the role is not mapped 
to any other role through the relation insr; i.e. it is not instantiated from any role. 
Similarly we can identify an abstract organisational domain if it is not mapped to any 
other organisational domain through the relation insd. This constraint is defined as 
follows:
2 role: Role • ( insr ( {role}) = 0  a  insd ( {role.org_domain}) * 0  ) v ( insr ( {role}) *
0  a  insd ( {role.org_domain}) = 0  )
The following constraint is to ensure that organisational domain aggregation
relationships do not relate instantiated organisational domains with abstract
organisational domains. This constraint is defined as follows:
Vod1; od2: Org_Domain • od1 e aggd ( {od2}) => ( insd ( {od1}) * 0  a  
insd ( {od2}) * 0  ) v (insd ( {od1}) = 0  a  insd ( {od2}) = 0  )
To prevent instantiated roles being used in policy definitions we have the 
following constraint:
2policy: Authorisation_Policy • insr ( {policy.role}) * 0
This basically states there is no policy for which the condition is satisfied that the role 
defined for the policy has been instantiated.
Instantiated roles are assigned to agents as follows: 
role_assignment: Agent <-> Role
Chapter 5 A Framework for Modelling Access Policies
We also need to model the carrying out of a task by an agent. This we represent 
via a relation performs, which defines an agent performing a task: 
performs: Agent <-> Task
The task in this relation must be instantiated. This is given by the following 
constraint:
Vp: performs • Vtask: ran performs • inst ( {task}) * 0
The assets to which agent has access are given in the task asset dependency, and must
be instantiated; furthermore they must be instantiated from assets defined in the task
asset dependency of the corresponding task from which the task was instantiated. This
is given by the following constraint:
Vp: performs • Vtask: ran performs •
Vins_asset: task_asset_dependency ( {task}) •
Basset: task_asset_dependency ( inst ( {task}) ) .  asset e insa ( {ins_asset})
The definitions above allow us to verify that a specific instantiation is consistent 
with a policy, through an invariant:
Vuser: Agent; user_task: T ask . user_task e performs ( {user}) =»
Brole: role_assignment ( {user}) •
Bpolicy: Authorisation_Policy • policy.role e inhr* ( insr ( {role})) a  
inst ({user_task}) c aggt* ({policy.task}) a  
Vasset: task_asset_dependency ( {user_task}) • 
role.org_domain e asset_domain ( {asset})
This invariant is defined in the form: P => Q. P is the assertion that an agent has 
executed a task (though P can be a set of mappings between agents and tasks), and Q 
is the logical condition that there is a policy (or set of policies) that permits P. In order 
for Q to be satisfied a policy must exist for which three conditions must be satisfied. 
First, there is some role assigned to the user that is compatible with a policy. The user 
role is an instantiation of an abstract role, and if this role is equivalent to or inherited 
from a role defined in a policy, then the role is compatible with the policy. Second,
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the task in the performs relation is instantiated from the task in the policy or one of its 
sub-tasks. Third, the assets being accessed through the task_asset_dependency must 
be in the same organisational domain as the user.
The invariant is therefore a check on the performs relation, which contains all 
mappings between agents in the system and instantiated tasks; i.e. tasks they can 
execute. If we define a mapping between an agent and a task in the performs relation, 
the invariant tells us whether it is permissible. If the invariant is true, then the task 
could be performed by that agent.
5.5 Heuristics for Defining and Verifying Policies
We now present some heuristics, illustrating how the framework can be used for 
defining and verifying policies, elaborating the example that we introduced with 
regard to policies for medical records earlier in this chapter. We present these 
heuristics as a set of steps that can form the basis of a method. The steps are as 
follows:
• Identify Organisational Groups
• Define Roles
• Identify Tasks and Assets
• Define Policies
• Verify Policies
In this section we now describe these steps in more detail.
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5.5.1 Identifying Organisational Groups
The first step is to identify the organisational groups and how they relate to one 
another, in order to derive organisational domain and functional grouping definitions. 
The diagram in figure 5.1 shows the organisational structure of a hospital.
Organisational
Domain
Ward A Ward B
Theatre
Nursing
Ward Nursing Surgery Radiology
1st Surgical 
Consultants Group
2nd Surgical 
Consultants Group
Nursing Medical Specialities Administration
Wandsworth Hospital
Organisational
Functions
Organisational
Functions
Organisational
Domains
Figure 5.1 Organisational Structure of a Hospital
The hospital serves a local community and is effectively a grouping based on 
market characteristics, with each hospital having an identical functional structure. We 
therefore define hospital as an organisational domain, having the organisational 
functions of nursing, medical specialities, and administration. These functions are 
further specialised, so for example the nursing function is specialised into ward 
nursing and theatre nursing, and the function medical specialities into specialities
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such as radiology and surgery. The ward nursing function is organised into wards, 
serving the patients stationed there, hence ward is an organisational domain; each 
medical speciality is divided into groups headed by a consultant serving sets of 
patients.
We can therefore derive the following organisational definitions. First of all we 
define the following organisational functions:
nursing, medical_specialities, ward_nursing, th ea tre jw sin g , surgery, radiology: 
Org_Function
We can translate these into a specialisation hierarchy using the principle of 
inheritance as follows:
{ward_nursing h-» nursing, th ea tre jw s in g  nursing,
surgery *-*■ medical_specialities, radiology ^  medical_specialities } e  inhf
We can also identify the following organisational domains: 
hospital, ward, consulting_group: Org_Domain 
These relate to one another in an aggregation hierarchy as follows:
{ward i-> hospital, consulting_group ■-> hospital} s  aggd
5.5.2 Identifying Levels of Authority
Within each grouping there is a hierarchical structure, which will determine how 
the delegation of activities is carried out. Each consultant carries responsibility in the 
form of accountability for patients in his care and can delegate treatment to registrars 
within the group.
Levels of authority need to be assigned to groups. In the hospital we have the 
following authority levels for doctors and nurses: 
consultant, registrar, s ta f f jw se , sister: Authority
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Amongst medical practitioners a registrar is junior to a consultant, and in the wards a 
sister is senior to a staff nurse:
{ registrar ■-» consultant, staff_nurse •-> sister} e senior
5.5.3 Defining Roles
Having defined the above organisational context, we are now in a position to
define roles, which are composite definitions. For example in the medical specialities
we can identify two roles:
consultant_medical_specialist: Role 
consultant_medical_specialist.authority = consultant 
consultant_medical_specialist.org_function = medical_specialities 
consultant_medical_specialist.org_domain = consultant group
registrar_medical_specialist: Role 
registrar_medical_specialist.authority = registrar 
registrar_medical_specialist.org_function = medical_specialities 
registrar_medical_specialist.org_domain = consultant group
We note here that we have defined the role with the function of 
medical_specialities rather than surgery or radiology, since the organisational function 
medical_specialities is a generalisation of the other two functions, then the role is in 
itself a generalisation of surgery or radiology roles. This is a convenience if we want 
to use this role to specify the restriction of the access to medical records as the type of 
speciality is irrelevant. We also have included the rather abstract domain definition of 
consultant_group. Again this is convenience, rather than defining a role for each 
consultants group in the hospital, we just simply define it using the meta-domain of 
consultant_group. The relationship between a meta-domain and domain is through the 
instantiation relation.
Similarly for nursing we can identify the following two roles: 
staff_nurse_ward, sister_ward: Role 
For the role staff nurse ward the definition is as follows:
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staff_nurse_ward. authority = staff_nurse 
staff_nurse_ward.org_function = w a rd jw sin g  
staff_nurse_ward.org_domain = ward
5.5.4 Identifying Tasks and Assets
We now need to identify the tasks and their associated assets in the organisation. 
For example we can identify the tasks: 
nurse_patient, treat_patient: Task
The tasks nurse_patient and treat_patient entail accessing nursing records and 
medical records respectively through the following sub-tasks, defined as follows: 
read_nursing_record, create_nursing_record, read_medical_record, 
create_medical_record: Task
The aggregation of these tasks can be modelled as follows:
{ nurse_patient ■-» read_nursing_record, nurse_patient *-> create_nursing_record , 
treat_patient ^  read_medical_record, treat_patient *-> create_medical_record } e
aggt
For the tasks read_nursing_record and create_nursing_record we can identify the 
asset, nursing_record to which this task requires access, and likewise the tasks 
read_medical_record and create_medical_record require access to the asset 
medical_record. We then define these assets and task dependencies: 
nursing_record, medical_record: Asset
{ read_nursing_record ■-> nursing_record, create_nursing_record ■-» nursing_record, 
read_medical_record medical_record, create_medical_record >-» medical_record } 
g task_asset_dependency
5.5.5 Defining Policies
Having defined the organisational context, roles and tasks, we now define 
policies. For example, in order to restrict the access of nursing records on the hospital 
wards we can define the following authorisation policy:
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staff_nurse_ward_policy: Authorisation_Policy 
We then set the role of the policy to a staff nurse: 
staff_nurse_ward_policy.role = staff_nurse
We can then assign the task and organisational domain to this policy:
staff_nurse_ward_policy.task = nurse_patient 
staff_nurse_ward_policy.org_domain = ward
5.5.6 Verifying Policies
The final step is to verify policies through scenarios. In order to illustrate this we
can define a scenario. We assume there is a nurse Judy_Smith, a staff nurse in
ward_A. We therefore define these instances as follows:
Judy_Smith: Agent 
ward_A: Org_Domain
The organisational domain instantiation relationship is defined as follows:
{ward_A ^  ward } e insd
We then define an instantiated role to represent a staff nurse on ward_A:
staff_nurse_ward_A: Role 
staff_nurse_ward_A.org_function = w ard jw sin g  
staff_nurse_ward_A.org_domain = ward_A 
staff_nurse_ward_A.authority = s ta f f jw s e
We can now assign the role to Judy Smith:
{ Judy_Smith <-> staff_nurse_ward_A} e role_assignment
We define an instantiation of an asset nursing_record_1:
nursing_record_1: Asset 
{ nursing_record_1 ■-» nursing_record } e insa
The asset domain of the nursing_record_1 is assigned to the ward as follows:
{ nursing_record_1 ■-» ward_A} e  asset_domain
We then define the following instantiated task, that represents the action of reading 
the nursing record nursing_record_1:
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read_nursing_record_1: Task
{ read_nursing_record_1 ■-» read_nursing_record } e  inst
This task relates to the asset nursing_record_1 in task_asset_dependency as follows:
{ nursing_record_1 ■-> nursing_record } e task_asset_dependency
The scenario of Judy_Smith reading the nursing record nursing_record_1 can be 
defined as the following mapping between the user Judy_Smith and the corresponding 
instantiated task:
{Judy_Smith ■-> read_nursing_record_1 } e  performs
If this is a valid performs definition, the following invariant that was introduced in 
section 5.4.7 must be maintained:
Vuser: Agent; user_task: Task • user_task e  perfoms ( {user}) =>
Brole: role_assignment ( {user}) •
Bpolicy: Authorisation_Policy • policy.role e  inhr* ( insr ( {role}))  a  
inst ( {user_task}) c  aggt* ( {policy.task}) a  
Vasset: task_asset_dependency ( {user_task}) • 
role.org_domain e  asset_domain ( {asset})
In order to prove this we apply proof rules ( Woodcock & Davies, 1992). We need to 
check the invariant is satisfied for the agent Judy_Smith and the above defined 
user_task.
Applying the V elimination rule twice, substituting Judy_Smith for user and 
read_nursing_record_1 for user_task, the expression user_task e  perfoms ( {user}) is
true because the following holds: 
read_nursing_record_1 e  performs ( {Judy_Smith)})
Applying the => elimination rule and the substitutions we applied above then the
following expression must be true:
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3role: role_assignment ( {Judy_Smith}) •
3policy: Authorisation_Policy • policy.role e  inhr* ( insr ( {role})) a  
inst ( {read_nursing_record_1}) c aggt* ( {policy.task}) a  
Vasset: task_asset_dependency ( {read_nursing_record_1}) • 
role.org_domain e  asset_domain ( {asset})
After applying the 3 elimination rule twice, substituting staff_nurse_ward_A for 
role, and staff_nurse_ward_policy for policy, we obtain the following expression that 
we need to prove is true:
staff_nurse_ward e  inhr* ( insr ( {staff_nurse_ward_A})) a  
inst ( {read_nursing_record_1}) c aggt* ( {nurse_patient}) a  
Vasset: task_asset_dependency ( {read_nursing_record_1}) • 
ward_A e asset_domain ( {asset})
The expression staff_nurse_ward e  inhr* ( insr ( {staff_nurse_ward_A}) )  expands to 
staff_nurse_ward e  {staff_nurse_ward}, and therefore it is true. The expression 
inst ( {read_nursing_record_1}) c aggt* ( {nurse_patient}) 
expands to {read_nursing_record} c {nurse_patient, read_nursing_record, 
create_nursing_record}; this is true, so we can also eliminate it.
The expression task_asset_dependency ( {read_nursing_record_1} ) expands to 
{nursing_record_1}. After applying the V elimination rule, and substituting
nursing_record_1 for asset we obtain: 
ward_A e  asset_domain ( {nursing_record_1})
Finally by expanding the function mapping asset_domain ( {nursing_record_1}) 
we get ward_A, so the expression is true. Thus the scenario is consistent with the 
policy definition.
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5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have presented a framework for formally defining the 
organisational context. It comprises a meta-model and a set of heuristics. The meta­
model is based on the principles by which organisations are differentiated on the basis 
of authority, functions and markets, enabling us to relate roles to the organisational 
context, and define access policies. A role is defined as a level of authority and 
organisational function within an organisational domain. We defined a set of 
heuristics for deriving definitions for the organisational context. We then explored 
how access policies can be defined to enforce the least minimum privileges principle. 
Finally we showed how we can verify that scenarios are consistent with policies.
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In the last chapter we presented a framework for developing access policies. What 
is unique about it compared to other approaches is that it allows us to define policies 
based on the characteristics by which an organisation divides work and assigns 
authority.
In this chapter we address the problem of extending current requirements 
modelling approaches and in particular how to integrate the conceptual framework 
that we presented in the previous chapter into an existing requirements modelling 
approach. There are two reasons for this: firstly, to be able to define access policies, 
independent of a specific system; and secondly to be able to define the constraints on 
functional requirements.
We demonstrate how formal Tropos and i* diagrams can be extended to 
incorporate the principles of the framework that we presented in the last chapter. In 
order to illustrate the extensions, we use the case study that we introduced in 
chapter 4.
6.1 Extensions to Tropos
In this section we describe the extensions to Tropos. We have already presented 
the definition of a role, which we associated with the organisational contextual
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elements of authority, organisational function, and organisational domain. We now 
demonstrate how formal Tropos can be extended to include the meta-concepts of the 
framework, how domain modelling can be carried out, and how instantiation can be 
achieved in order to verify policies.
6.1.1 Representing Strategic Rational Diagrams in Formal Tropos
Fuxman et al. (2001) do not explain how a Strategic Rationale (SR) model in i*
can be represented in formal Tropos. As we described in chapter 4, an SR model is
essential to the definition of a policy in that the actor boundary is used to define an
access policy to the tasks and resources within the boundary, and hence we extend
formal Tropos accordingly.
Our representation of an SR diagram is illustrated below, using an indentation to
represent the means-end to a goal, and the resource dependency relationship to the
actor. We have added a type attribute to actor to enable us to differentiate between
agents, positions, and roles.
Actor Programmer 
Type Position 
Goal Develop Software 
Mode Achieve 
Task Write Code 
Resource Program Module
We have also added inheritance, aggregation, and instantiation between domain
elements using the keywords IsA, Part, and INS respectively, as used in i*.
6.1.2 Linking Actor Definitions to the Organisational Context
Next we consider the modelling of roles and associated organisational 
characteristics. Referring back to the example of Liu et al. in chapter 2, family doctor 
was defined as an agent and Dr. Anthony as an instantiation of that agent. We follow
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the convention of i* in that an actor of type Agent maps onto an agent in our 
framework, since this represents a physical agent. For representing abstract and 
instantiated roles we have decided to use actor of type role in the i* framework.
The organisational context definitions, authority, organisational function, and 
organisational domain can be defined as classes. In the last chapter we defined a role 
as being associated with these three organisational contextual characteristics. 
Although the i* framework differentiates actor definitions further into agents, roles 
and positions, formal Tropos only includes actor definitions. We have added a type 
definition to the actor definition to differentiate between roles, positions, and agents.
The following are definitions of the software project organisation we introduced in 
chapter 4, to illustrate how to link actor definitions to the organisational context. First 
of all we define two levels of authority, Project Manager and Engineer. A Project 
Manager is senior to an Engineer.
Authority Project Manager
Authority Engineer 
Senior Project Manager
We then define some organisational functions. In the organisational functions
below, IT Testing is a specialisation of IT Development.
Organisational Function IT Development
Organisational Function IT Testing 
IsA IT Development
There are two organisational domains of Project and Sub-Project.
Organisational Domain Project
Organisational Domain Sub-Project 
Part Project
With these organisational contextual definitions, we can now define the following 
actors:
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Actor IT Project Manager 
Type Role
Authority Project Manager 
Organisational Function IT Development 
Organisational Domain Project
Actor Test Engineer 
Type Role 
Authority Engineer 
Organisational Function IT Test 
Organisational Domain Project
The properties we described in the last chapter of inheritance and aggregation can 
modelled through a Part and IsA characteristics respectively, these correspond to the 
inheritance and aggregation mappings, which we introduced in the previous chapter, 
as follows:
The relation inhf representing the inheritance between organisational functions is 
mapped on to the IsA attribute of an organisational function definition, where the 
organisational function that has the attribute, is inheriting from the organisational 
function that is the attribute.
The aggregation between domains aggd is represented by the Part attribute of 
organisational domain, where the organisational domain that has the attribute, is a 
sub-domain of the organisational domain that is defined as the attribute. So for 
example the organisational domain Sub-Project is a sub-domain of Project, which is 
related in the form of a Part attribute for Sub-Project domain. The IsA characteristic 
can be used to define the inheritance between the organisational functions of IT 
Development and IT Testing.
In the last chapter we described an invariant which relates the inheritance between 
roles and those between organisational functions and organisational domains. This 
invariant also holds here, whereby, for an actor, whether a position or role, which has 
an organisational function, which is inherited from an organisational function of
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another actor with the same organisational domain means an inheritance exists 
between those two actors.
6.1.3 Tasks and Resource Definitions
The task and asset definitions in the framework meta-model presented in chapter 5 
correspond to task and resource definitions in Tropos. The task aggregation aggt is 
mapped into the i* framework as a task decomposition link, which is not currently 
defined in formal Tropos. The link between tasks and assets in the relation, 
task_asset_dependency, also corresponds to a decomposition link between tasks and 
resources in the i* framework. This is simply represented through defining the 
resources associated with a task underneath a task definition but indented. Task 
decomposition is represented in an identical way.
The following task Test Software can be divided into three sub-tasks of Prepare
Test Plan, Read Test Plan, and Update Test Result, and these subtasks in themselves
depend on the resources Test Plan and Test Result:
Task Test Software 
Task Prepare Test Plan, Read Test Plan, Update Test Result
Task Prepare Test Plan 
Resource Test Plan
Task Read Test Plan 
Resource Test Plan
Task Update Test Result 
Resource Test Result
The following task Approve Software Release depends on the resources Test Result
and Release Note:
Task Approve Software Release 
Resource Test Result 
Resource Release Note
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6.1.4 Defining Access Policies
Access policies as we defined in the last section are effectively mapped to actors
and their boundaries. In the i* framework these are represented by the tasks and
associated resources within the actor boundary.
Effectively an access policy is defined through the actor boundary. So for example
we may want to restrict the task Approve Software Release to the IT Project Manager.
The above policy definition is simply represented as an actor boundary.
We can therefore define the following actor:
Actor IT Project Manager 
Type Role
Authority Project Manager 
Organisational Function IT Development 
Organisational Domain Project 
Task Approve Software Release
6.1.5 Defining Scenarios
An agent in the framework meta-model presented in chapter 5 corresponds to an 
instantiated agent in Tropos, and the role corresponds to a Tropos role definition. An 
instantiated role in extended Tropos is associated with an instantiated organisational 
domain. Continuing our example of a software project organisation, and focusing on 
the policy to approve a software release, we can define an organisational domain as 
follows:
Organisational Domain Library Administration System Project INS Project 
Since this policy involves access to the assets, Release Note and Test Result, through 
the task Approve Software Release, we also need an instantiation for the 
corresponding task and resources:
Resource Release Note Version 1 INS Release Note
Resource Test Result Version 1 INS Test Result
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Task Approve Software Release Version 1 INS Approve Software Release 
Resource Release Note Version 1 
Resource Test Result Version 1
Having defined these instantiations we can then define the instantiation of the 
role:
Actor IT Project Manager Library Admin. Project INS IT Project Manager 
Type Role
Organisational Domain Library Administration System Project
The definition of an individual executing a task is as follows, assigning an agent to
an instantiated role through the relation OCCUPIES, and relating it to a task:
Actor John Smith OCCUPIES IT Project Manager Library Admin. Project 
Type Agent
Task Approve Software Release Version 1 
This instantiation represents a combination of the agent role assignment 
(role_assignment), and agent task mapping (performs) in the framework presented in 
chapter 5.
6.2 Representing the Organisational Context in i*
In this section, we propose how the formal Tropos extensions we introduced in the 
previous section could be represented in i* framework diagrams.
As explained earlier in this chapter, there are two types of i* framework diagrams: 
Strategic Dependency (SD) diagrams that show the dependency between actors, and 
Strategic Rationale (SR) diagrams that focus on a single actor and his goals.
An example of an SD diagram is shown in figure 6.1. In order to represent the 
organisational context on SD diagrams we have introduced a new symbol to represent 
organisational domains, a dashed circle with a label containing the name.
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Sub-Project
ProjectPART
IT Project 
ManagerIT Development 
Engineer
SENIOR
ISA
Test Engineer
INS
INSINS
Library Admin. 
Project
IT Project Manager 
Library Admin. Project
OCCUPIES
Test Engineer 
Library Admin. 
Project
John
Smith
Organisational Domain✓
PART INS
 ^ Organisational Domain Aggregation  Instantiation
OCCUPIES ISA
 ^  Occupies Relationship  ^ ISA Relationship
SENIOR
______ ^ Senior Relationship
Figure 6.1 Extended i* Strategic Dependency Diagram
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The seniority relation is simply represented by an arrow with the keyword SENIOR 
between actors. This shows that the actor in this relationship, to which the arrow is 
pointing, has a level of authority more senior to the other actor for the same function 
and within the same organisational domain. The other relations and symbols already 
exist in the i* framework and have been reused.
We have only represented those aspects that are relevant to relating actors to the 
organisational context. Other aspects of an SD diagram would be modelled as before. 
The organisational function and level of authority could be represented on the SR 
diagram as labels.
Diagrams of the organisational structure could be represented independently of 
actors, to show how organisational domains, organisational functions, and levels of 
authority relate to one another. We do not explore this however in this thesis.
6.3 Mapping Formal Tropos Policies to Framework Definitions in Z
The extensions to formal Tropos that we have introduced in this chapter are 
derived from the framework meta-model that we introduced in chapter 5. In order to 
apply the approach to analysis that we presented in the previous chapter, we need to 
be able to translate the formal Tropos model into the equivalent constructs in Z. Table
6.1 summarises translation rules to be able to do this.
Formal Tropos Framework Definitions in Z
Meta-Concept Translation Rules
Task T T: Task
Resource R R: Asset
Authority A A: Authority
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Organisational Domain OD OD: Org_Domain
Organisational Function OF OF: Org_Function
Actor AC 
Type Role 
Authority AU
Organisational Function OF 
Organisational Domain OD
AC: Role 
AC.authority = AU 
AC.org_function = OF 
AC.org_domain = OD
Authority, Inheritance and Aggregation Hierarchies Translation Rules
Organisational Function OF1
IsA OF2
OF1:Org Function 
{ OF1 >-> OF2 } e inhf
Organisational Domain OD1 
Part OD2
OD1: Org_Domain 
{OD1 i-> OD2} e aggd
Task T1 
TaskT2  
Task T3
T1: Task
{T1 ^  T2, T1 *-> T3, ...T1 ^  TN } e  aggt
Task TN
Task T 
Resource R1 
Resource R2
T: Task
{ T ^ R 1 ,T ^ R 2 ,  ... T >-> RN } g 
task_asset_dependency
Resource RN
Actor AC1 ISA AC2 AC1: Role
{AC1 AC2 } g inhr
Policy Definition Translation Rule
Actor A 
Type Role 
Task T
ATP: Authorisation_Policy 
ATP.role = A 
ATP.task = T
Instantiation Translation Rules
Resource A1 INSA2 
Organisation Domain OD1
A1: Asset
{A1 i-> A2 } e insa
{A1 i-» OD1 } g  asset_domain
Task T1 INS T2 
Resource R1 
Resource R2
Resource RN
T1: Task 
{T1 •-> T2 } g  inst
{T1 *->R1,T1 R2,... T1 i-> RN } g  
task_asset_dependency
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Organisational Domain OD1 INS OD2 OD1:Org Domain 
{ OD1 -> OD2 } e insd
Actor ACOD1 INS AC 
Type Role
Organisation Domain OD1
ACOD1: Role 
{ACOD1 i-> A C} g insr 
ACOD1.org_domain = OD1
Actor AG OCCUPIES ACOD1 
Type Agent 
Task T
AG: Agent
{AG i-> ACOD1 } e role_assignment 
{AG i-» T } g performs
Table 6.1 Mapping Formal Tropos to Framework Definitions in Z
We can illustrate the mapping rules with some examples. The definition for the
level of authority of Project Manager maps using the corresponding meta-concept
translation mapping rule as follows:
Authority Project Manager
Project Manager: Authority
The definition for the level of authority Engineer, which has a seniority
relationship with Project Manager, is mapped using the authority hierarchy mapping
rule. This rule is an extension of the meta-concept translation rule used above. The
mapping is as follows:
Authority Engineer 
Senior Project Manager
Engineer: Authority
{ Engineer ^  Project M anager} e senior
The actor definition IT Project Manager is mapped as follows:
Actor IT Project Manager 
Type Role
Authority Project Manager 
Organisational Function IT Development 
Organisational Domain Project
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IT Project Manager: Role 
IT Project Manager.authority = Project Manager 
IT Project Manager.org_function = IT Development 
IT Project Manager.org_domain = Project
The definition for the agent John Smith maps as follows:
Actor John Smith OCCUPIES IT Project Manager Library Admin. Project 
Type Agent
Task Approve Software Release Version 1 
John Smith: Agent
{ John Smith >-» IT Project Manager Library Admin. Project} e role_assignment 
{ John Smith >-» Approve Software Release Version 1 } e performs
The prerequisite for this rule is that the definitions for the role IT Project Manager 
Library Admin. Project, the instantatiated task Approve Software Release Version 1, 
and associated resources, Release Note Version 1 and Test Results Version 1, have 
been defined.
6.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have extended the requirements modelling language of formal 
Tropos, and demonstrated how these extensions could be represented on i* SD 
diagrams. We selected the i* framework for extension because of its focus on the 
social context and how actors relate to one another, which is the basis for the 
organisational context.
We demonstrated how the framework we presented in chapter 5 can be used as a 
basis for extending the i* framework. It addresses the problems that we identified in 
chapter 3 with regard to the actor definitions. In chapter 3 we highlighted the need to 
have precise actor definitions as a prerequisite for defining policies, and in this 
chapter we demonstrated how actor definitions in formal Tropos, an extension of i*, 
can be extended to link them to the organisational context.
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We also showed how formal Tropos definitions can be mapped to the Z model 
presented in chapter 5, and hence be used as a basis for formal reasoning.
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Chapter 7
Automated Analysis using Alloy
In chapter 5 we presented a framework for defining policies and scenarios in Z, 
and reasoning about them in order to verify that the scenarios are consistent with the 
policies defined.
In this chapter we propose an automated approach using the modelling and 
analysis tool, Alloy. We first justify the use of Alloy for this purpose, and introduce 
the Alloy modelling language. We then illustrate how we can translate the framework 
meta-model introduced in chapter 5 into the Alloy modelling language. Finally, 
having translated the meta-model and access policy constructs from our meta-model 
into Alloy, we demonstrate how the verification of policies can be carried out.
7.1 Verification Alternatives
Two alternatives for automating the analysis were considered.
One alternative would be to use a theorem prover. There are tools which would 
enable us to perform proofs in the Z language, examples of which include Z-Eves or 
CadiZ. However, theorem provers are difficult to use as expert knowledge in logic 
and set theory is required to be able to define a proof strategy.
A more promising alternative to formal proofs is the use of lightweight formal 
checking tools, so called because they check formal models without proving 
theorems, and hence requiring less expertise in logic and set theoretics than is
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necessary for theorem provers. They can be used for validating the model as they are 
supported by tools. There are essentially those tools that enable a specification to be 
animated, such as IFAD (Fitzgerald & Larsen, 1998), and those that perform 
exhaustive checks to determine whether assertions are adhered to, such as Alloy 
(Jackson, 2004) or NuSMV (Cimatti et al., 2002). The checker tools are much more 
rigorous than animation tools, as through an animation only limited scenarios can be 
tested, whereas in the case of an exhaustive checker many more scenarios will be 
tested. The NuSMV checking tool has been applied in the case of formal Tropos 
(Fuxman et al., 2001). An advantage that Alloy has over NuSMV for this research 
project, is that it is based on the Z language, employing the same logical and set 
theoretic notions as Z, and hence is much easier to translate to than an NuSMV model 
would be. An advantage that NuSMV has, is that it can evaluate some temporal 
constraints, though not all. For the purposes of using NuSMV for evaluating formal 
Tropos, Fuxman et al. (2001) extended the tool to handle additional forms of temporal 
constraints, and also to be able to generate instances automatically. Since the security 
constraints that we are exploring are always to be maintained, the temporal constraints 
are not interesting and were therefore not a decisive factor in selecting a tool for 
validation. Due to the similarities of Z to Alloy and the ease of translation, Alloy was 
chosen. We used Alloy version 3.0 (Jackson, 2004).
7.2 Introduction to Alloy
The Alloy language is supported by an Alloy analyser. As we mentioned above 
the Alloy language can be viewed as a subset of Z, Alloy is a declarative language 
which enables the structural properties and functions of a system to be modelled. 
Assertions can be defined representing properties of the system that must be adhered
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to. The tool enables one to execute functions and so animate a model and also check 
assertions hold by searching for counter examples.
7.2.1 Types and Relations
Fundamentally Alloy models are constructed from relations and atoms. Atoms are 
entities, and relations are mappings between different types of atoms. In Alloy all 
expressions pertain to relations and sets do not exist; they are in effect represented by 
unary relations.
Basic types in Z can be translated into signatures in Alloy using the keyword sig. 
A signature in Alloy represents a type of atom. So for example sig Org_Domain {} 
defines the basic type of an organisational domain. An instantiation of this type would 
result in an atom. The instantiation of atoms is carried out in Alloy when a model 
assertion or function is executed.
Relations between atoms can be defined within the signatures; for example if we 
wish to define a type asset, which is related to organisational domain, this can be 
defined as a field within the signature of type asset as follows: 
sig Asset {
asset_domain: Org_Domain}
This can be used as a correspondence to the following definition in Z. 
asset_domain: Asset —» Org_Domain
A field can also be defined as a relation. We could therefore define the above asset
domain relation as follows:
sig Asset_Domain { 
asset_domain: Asset->Org_Domain}
However defining it in this way would result in additional definitions of type 
Asset_Domain, which are unnecessary.
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Alloy enables us to define sub-signatures, which effectively represent subsets of a 
specific signature, this is achieved using an extends declaration as follows: 
medical_record extends Asset {}
This is useful for defining derived types such as in this case where a medical record is 
a type of asset. Sub-signatures automatically inherit the properties of the signature that 
they extend. A signature can be defined as one, which means that the signature 
contains only a single atom. This is useful for modelling instantiations of signature 
types. For example we can define some specific agents as follows: 
one sig John, James, Fred, Jonathan extends Agent {}
In Z this could be equivalently defined as follows:
John, James, Fred, Jonathan: Agent
There are three special set operators iden, univ and none, which represent the 
identity relation, which includes relations of each element to itself, the universal 
relation, which includes all elements, and the empty relation, which contains no 
element.
7.2.2 Operators and Quantifiers
Types as described in the last section represent sets of atoms; the following set 
operators are available:
+ union
& intersection
-  difference
For comparison there are the operators:
= equivalence
in membership
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So for example if nurses and doctors are sets of agents and hospital_staff is a union of
nurses and doctors then the following apply:
hospital_staff = nurses + doctors
nurses = hospital_staff - doctors
In addition there are logical operators:
! negation operator, whereby !A is not A.
&& conjunction operator, whereby A && B is A and B.
|| disjunction operator, whereby A || B is A or B.
=> the implies operator, whereby A => B means if A is true then B is also
true.
<=> the bi-implies operator, whereby A <=> B means A implies B and vice-
versa.
The quantifiers are:
all A: B | C is the universal quantifier, for all A in B, C is true.
some A: B | C is the existential quantifier, for some A in B, C is true.
sole A: B | C represents that no more than one A in B exists for which C
is true.
no A: B | C represents that no A in B exist for which C is true.
one A: B | C represents that exactly one A exists in B for which C is true.
Relational operators are:
is a join between two relations. For the join p.q, it is the relation arising 
by taking every combination of each tuple in p and q, and including 
their join. If p is a set and q is a binary relation, then this produces the 
relational image of p under q.
is the transpose operator, which reverses all the tuples in the relation.
A is the transitive closure operator. If a signature A { f: set A } contains a
relation to elements of the same type then a transitive closure of an 
element x of type A contains all x.f + x.f.f + x.f.f.f...
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* is the reflexive closure operator, which contains the transitive closure
plus the relationship of an element to itself. If a signature A { f: set A } 
contains a relation to elements of the same type then a reflexive closure 
of an element x of type A contains all x + x.f + x.f.f + x.f.f.f...
-> is the product of two relations. The product p->q is the relation given
by taking every combination of each tuple in p and q, and 
concatenating them.
7.2.3 Invariant and Function Definitions
Invariants in the model can be defined as facts. For example the following 
definition of a role has a relation insr, which relates an instantiated role to an abstract 
role.
sig Role { 
insr: set R ole}
fact {
all rolel, role2: Role | rolel.insr = role2 => role2.insr = none}
This fact restricts the definitions of roles such that a role can not be instantiated from 
a role that is itself an instantiated role.
Predicates can be defined which describe how state changes can be enacted. 
Predicate definitions include parameters, and describe how the state of these 
parameters are changed. For example the following predicate describes how an 
organisational domain can be added to the aggregation of another organisational 
domain.
pred add_agg_domain (od1, od1\ od2: Org_Domain) { 
od1 ’.aggd = od1 .aggd + od2 }
7.2.4 Recursive Relations
As we mentioned above, a relation in Alloy can be defined as a field of a 
signature. If it is of the same type then we can define a recursive relation, which is 
useful for representing hierarchies. Thus the following is how we define an 
organisational domain and the aggregation hierarchy as a relation:
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sig Org_Domain { 
aggd: set Org_Domain}
This is equivalent to the following definitions in Z:
[Org_Domain]
aggd: Org_Domain -+> Org_Domain
In defining invariants or assertions we sometimes need to define the transitive or 
transitive-reflexive closure of a relation. An example of this is the following 
constraint that we defined for an organisational domain, that an organisational domain 
can not be an aggregation of itself:
Vod: Org_Domain . od e aggd+ ( {od})
This constraint can be defined in Alloy as follows: 
fact { all od: Org_Domain | od !in od.Aaggd }
The expression aggd+ ( {od}) is translated into Alloy as od.Aaggd. The join operator 
acts as a relational image of od under the transitive closure of the relation aggd, 
restricting the domain to od.
Although aggd is a field of Org_Domain, it can be referenced without being on the 
left hand side of a join operator; the expression od.aggd gives us a set of type 
Org_Domain, but aggd is the binary relation of type Org_Domain ->Org_Domain. For 
example the above constraint could be defined as follows: 
fact { all od: Org_Domain | od->od !in Aag g d }
7.2.5 Modules
Models can be divided into modules. Models or parts of models can therefore be 
reused by defining them within a module that can then be included by other models. 
There are two keywords open and use to include modules, the only difference being 
that when use is used to include modules definitions, then they have to be qualified,
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whereas with open they do not. Thus in the following example the signature
Org_Domain we defined above could be included in the module Organisation:
Module Organisation 
sig Org_Domain {
■ }
This can then be included in a module that defines the predicate add_agg_domain 
as follows:
Module Organisation_Functions 
open Organisation
pred add_agg_domain (od1, o d f , od2: Org_Domain) { 
odT.aggd = od1 .aggd + o d 2 }
7.3 Modelling Policies in Alloy
We now demonstrate how the policy framework meta-model presented in chapter 
5 can be represented in the Alloy language, and how analysis can be performed.
7.3.1 Modelling the Framework Meta-Concepts and Relations
As we explained in chapter 5, the policy framework consists of a meta-model with 
meta-concepts and their relations. It is these meta-concepts and relations that form the 
basis of the extensions to formal Tropos. We can now demonstrate how these meta­
concepts and relations translate from our Z definitions into Alloy. A diagram of the 
meta-model in Alloy is shown in figure 7.1.
Meta-concepts can be represented as signatures in Alloy so for example, the meta 
concept [Org_Domain] translates simply into the following signature: 
sig Org_Domain {}
A similar translation applies to the other meta concepts of [Asset], [Task], [Authority], 
and [Org_Function].
Inheritance and aggregation hierarchies in our Z model that are modelled as 
relations, are also represented as relations in Alloy; but as described above, relations
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must be defined within signatures; thus for example, in order to represent the relation 
aggd: Org_domain -+> Org_domain the Org_Domain signature is extended as follows:
sig Org_Domain { 
aggd: set Org_Domain}
Tole_assignm ent performs J role task
in s r) inhr in s tj aggt
org_function \  authority isk_asset_dependency
org_domain insa
seniorinhf sset domain
in sd ja g g d
TaskRole
Asset
Agent
Authority
Org_Domain
Org_Function
A.uthorisation_Policy
Figure 7.1 Framework Meta-Model in Alloy
Roles and policies are composite meta-concepts, and include other meta-concepts 
as members. So, for example the role is defined as follows: 
sig Role {
authority: Authority, 
org_function: Org_Function, 
org_domain: Org_Domain, 
inhr: set R ole}
As we see here there are three members of type Authority, Org_Funotion and 
Org_Domain, and in addition there is the role inheritance hierarchy, defined using the 
relation inhr.
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7.3.2 Policy Domain Definitions
In order to define the model for an application domain, specific definitions need to 
be made. These are achieved by creating unique atoms as subsets of the meta­
concepts. So for example if we wish to define ward as an organisational domain, with 
hospital as an aggregation, we would define it as follows:
one sig ward extends Org_Domain {} 
fact {ward.aggd = hospital}
All other domain specific definitions are made using this form of construct. If a
relation such as aggd does not relate to a set, then the range is defined as none, as in
the following example:
one sig hospital extends Org_Domain {} 
fact { hospital.aggd = none}
This is necessary otherwise the Alloy tool may set the range to an arbitrary value.
7.3.3 Policy Framework Domain Instantiations
In order to instantiate domain concepts we need use the instantiation relations that
we translate from our framework meta-model in Z. So for example the Org_Domain
signature includes an instantiation relation for this purpose as follows:
sig Org_Domain { 
insd: set Org_Domain}
This represents the relation:
insd: Org_domain Org_domain.
This form of instantiation also follows for tasks, assets and roles. Agents are 
themselves instantiations but are assigned to instantiated roles. The following shows 
an example of an agent definition that has been assigned the instantiated role of a 
General Practitioner.
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one sig Dr_Smith extends Agent {}
fact { Dr_Smith.role_assignment = General_Practitioner_Dr_Jones_Practice }
Thus if we define an instantiation of a General Practice, then as above with the 
policy domain definitions we create unique atoms as subsets of the meta-concepts, but 
relate them to the domain concepts, through the instantiation relations, defined as a 
fact. So if Dr Jones Practice is an instantiation of General Practice, this is defined as 
follows:
one sig Dr_Jones_Practice extends Org_Domain {} 
fact { Dr_Jones_Practice.insd = General_Practice}
As with policy domain definitions, for empty relations we set the range to none.
7.3.4 Policy Verification
In order to verify policies in our framework as we explained in chapter 5, we use 
an instantiated task that represents the carrying out of a task on specific instances of 
assets, related through the task asset dependency. In Alloy we represent this via a 
performs relation, which defines an agent performing a task, and is defined as a 
relation on an agent through the agent signature as follows: 
sig Agent {
performs: set T ask }
The policy framework invariant that we described in chapter 5 that needs to be 
satisfied in order for instantiations of performs relations to satisfy policies, is as 
follows: 
fact {
all user: Agent, task: Task | user_task in user.performs =>
some user_role: user.role_assignment | some policy: Authorisation_Policy |
policy.role in user_role.insr.*inhr
&& task.inst in policy.task.*aggt
&& all asset: user_task.task_asset_dependency |
user_role.org_domain in asset.asset_dom ain}
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As described above consistency checks can be made through the use of assertions. 
In order to check a particular scenario an assertion can be defined. The tool will then 
search for a solution that breaks the assertion; if no solution can be found, then with a 
high degree of certainty we can assume that the assertion is correct.
7.3.5 Model Consistency Checks
In chapter 5 we described a number invariants that ensure the model is consistent 
with principles of the framework. These include invariants such as ensuring that roles 
do not inherit themselves or that instantiated elements are not used in policy 
definitions. There are two alternatives as to how this can be checked in Alloy: the first 
is to define them as facts; the second is to define them as assertions. The first 
alternative is suitable when Alloy generates all the instantiations, as it will ensure that 
the invariants are enforced. Our method of instantiation, however, is to generate them 
explicitly to create specific scenarios. If a mistake is made in any of the domain and 
scenario definitions, then running a check in a policy verification may give no 
solution, because the invariants have not been satisfied, and not because the policy has 
been correctly verified. Checking assertions that the invariants have been satisfied 
will give us much greater confidence that the definitions have been made as intended. 
For example to ensure that roles do not inherit themselves we can run the following 
assertion:
assert check_role_inheritance { 
all r: Role | r !in r.Ainhr}
In chapter 5 we introduced invariants that need to be maintained if policy and 
scenario definitions are consistent. These are summarised in table 7.1.
- 123 -
Chapter 7 Automated Analysis using Alloy
Alloy Invariant Description
all r: Role | r !in r.Ainhr Defines a role can not inherit itself.
all of: Org_Function | of !in of Ainhf Defines an organisational function 
can not inherit itself.
all od: Org_Domain | od !in od Aaggd Defines an organisational domain can 
not be an aggregation of itself.
all rolel, role2: Role | role2 in rolel Ainhr => 
role2.org_function in rolel.org_function Ainhf 
&& rolel.org_domain = role2.org_domain && 
rolel.authority = role2.authority
Defines that a role, role2, that is 
inherited by rolel must have an 
organisational function that is 
inherited by the organisational 
function assigned to rolel and must 
have an identical level of authority 
and organisational domain.
no role: Role | role.insr = none && 
role.org_domain.insd != none || role.insr != 
none && role.org_domain.insd = none
This defines that an abstract role (i.e. 
non-instantiated) is not associated 
with an instantiated organisational 
domain, and that an instantiated role 
is not associated with an abstract 
domain.
all au: Authority | au !in au.Asenior Defines that a level of authority can 
not be senior to itself.
all t: Task 11 !in t.Aaggt Defines that a task can not be an 
aggregation of itself.
all a: Agent | all task: agent.performs | 
task.inst != none
Defines that all tasks performed by an 
agent are instantiated.
all a: Agent | all task: agent.performs | all 
ins_asset: task.task_asset_dependency | 
some asset: task.inst.task_asset_dependency 
| asset in ins.asset.insa
Defines that all assets in the task asset 
dependency of a task performed by an 
agent are instantiated from assets in 
the task asset dependency of the 
corresponding task from which the 
task was instantiated.
all rolel, role2: Role | rolel.insr = role2 => 
role2.insr = none
Defines that a role can not be 
instantiated from a role that itself is 
an instantiation.
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all od1, od2: Org_Domain | odl.insd = od2 => 
od2.insd = none
Defines that an organisational domain 
can not be instantiated from an 
organisational domain that itself is an 
instantiation.
all od1, od2: Org_Domain | odl.aggd = od2 
=> odl.insd = none && od2.insd = none || 
odl.insd != none && od2.insd != none
Defines that both organisational 
domains in an aggregation relation 
should be both either instantiated or 
non-instantiated.
all a1 , a2: Asset | a1 .insa = a2 => 
a2.insa = none
Defines that an asset can not be 
instantiated from an asset that itself is 
an instantiation.
no policy: Authorisation_Policy | 
policy.role.insr != none
Defines there is no policy associated 
with an instantiated role.
Table 7.1 Framework Invariants in Alloy
7.3.6 Mapping from Formal Tropos into Framework Definitions in Alloy
In the previous chapter we presented a mapping from formal Tropos into the 
framework definitions in Z. In order to translate policies defined using formal Tropos 
into Alloy to carry out an analysis, we need to adapt these mapping rules. These are 
summarised in the table 7.2.
Formal Tropos Meta-Model Definitions in Alloy
Meta-Concept Translation Rules
Task T one sig T extends Task {}
Resource R one sig R extends Asset {}
Authority A one sig A extends Authority {}
Organisational Domain 0 one sig 0  extends Org_Domain {}
Organisational Function OF one sig OF extends Org_Function {}
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Actor AC 
Type Role 
Authority AU
Organisational Function OF 
Organisational Domain OD
one sig AC extends Role {} 
fact {AC.authority = AU } 
fact {AC.org_function = O F } 
fact {AC.org_domain = OD }
Authority, Inheritance and Aggregation Hierarchies Translation Rules
Authority AU1 
Senior AU2
one sig AU1 extends Authority {} 
fact {AU1 .senior = AU2 }
Organisational Function OF1 
IsA OF2
one sig OF1 extends Org Function {} 
fact { OF1 .inhr = O F2}
Organisational Domain OD1 
Part OD2
one sig OD1 extends Org_Domain {} 
fact { OD1 .aggd = OD2 }
Task T1 
Task T2
one sig T1 extends Task {} 
fact { T1 .aggt = T2 ...+TN }
Task TN
Task T 
Resource R1
Resource RN
one sig T extends Task {}
fact{T.task asset dependency = R1...+
RN}
Actor AC1 ISA AC2 one sig AC1 extends Role {} 
fact {AC1 .inhr = AC2}
Policy Definition Translation Rule
Actor A 
Type Role 
Task T
one sig AP extends Authorisation_Policy {} 
fact {AP.role = A } 
fact {AP.task = T }
Instantiation Translation Rules
Resource R1 INS R2 
Organisation Domain OD1
one sig R1 extends Asset {}
fact { R l.insa = R 2 }
fact { R1 .asset_domain = OD1 }
Task T1 INS T2 
Resource R1
one sig T1 extends Task {}
fact { Tl.inst = T 2 }
fact {T1 .asset_dependency = R1 }
Organisational Domain OD1 INS OD2 one sig OD1 extends Org_Domain {} 
fact { OD1 .insd = OD2 }
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Actor ACOD1 INS AC 
Organisation Domain OD1
one sig ACOD1 extends Role {}
fact {ACOD1 .insd = AC }
fact {ACOD1 .org_domain = OD1 }
Actor AG OCCUPIES ACOD1 
Task T1
one sig AG extends Agent {}
fact {AG.role_assignment = ACOD1}
fact {AG. performs = T1 }
Table 7.2 Mapping Framework Z Definitions to Alloy
7.3.7 Structuring Modules
As we described above, Alloy enables the model to be divided up; this helps in 
scaling the model for large applications as the model can be broken down into 
manageable chunks. Figure 7.2 shows how the framework definitions represented in 
an Alloy model can be divided into modules.
module scenario 1 module scenario n
module policy 1 module policy n
module framework
module organisation 1 module organisation 2 module organisation n
Figure 7.2 Module Structure of the Framework in Alloy
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At the highest level is the module framework that includes all the meta-definitions. 
An organisation can be divided up, so it is possible to split the organisational 
contextual and role definitions into separate modules for parts of the organisation. So, 
for example, the organisational contextual and role definitions for the IT development 
department of a bank could be separately defined from those in the bank branches. 
These definitions are then included in modules organisation 1 to n for n organisational 
units. Then for each of these organisational units, each policy can be defined in its 
own policy module. Finally for each of these policies, several scenarios can be 
defined, each in its own module.
7.4 Alloy Evaluation
The key advantage of Alloy is the automated checking that the tool performs. 
However it does not do this by proving the assertion as we demonstrated using Z in 
chapter 5, but through a search for counter examples. If a counter example is not 
found, this does not necessarily mean that the model is consistent or correct, it can 
also produce this result if the model is inconsistent. It is a problem that the tool does 
not display the reasoning. However by negating assertions it is possible to produce 
counter examples, as we demonstrated. Examining counter examples, which the tool 
displays, gives us greater confidence that a model we create is correct. Executing 
assertions to check the invariants that we presented in table 7.1, are also very useful in 
identifying inconsistencies.
7.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have demonstrated how automated analysis can be carried out 
using the tool Alloy. We began by outlining the reasons for using Alloy, firstly due to
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the ease by which assertions can be checked, and secondly because of the similarity 
between the Alloy Language and Z. We then introduced the main features of Alloy. 
We demonstrated how our framework can be represented in Alloy. We showed how 
assertions can be defined and used to check the consistency of scenarios to policy 
definitions. Finally, we demonstrated how Alloy models can be divided into modules. 
This breakdown into modules aids scalability by reducing the size of the model 
required for each scenario that is to be analysed.
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We have already used two case studies in this thesis, the first one to introduce the 
policy framework in chapter 5, and the second one in chapters 4 and 6 to illustrate 
how formal Tropos could be extended. The case study presented in this chapter 
demonstrates how a formal Tropos policy model can be constructed, translated into 
Alloy, and analysed using the Alloy tool. The selected case study from the literature 
(Schaad, 2003) explores several principles of management control, including the 
minimum privileges principle, delegation, and the separation of duties, making it 
particularly well suited to exploring access policies. Here we continue to focus on the 
minimum privileges principle.
8.1 Case Study Description
The case study is based on an access control system of a European bank. The bank 
has 50,000 employees, over a thousand branches, and provides banking services for 
local communities. Schaad (2003) reviews the bank’s access control system, and how 
it satisfies organisational control principles. Although the focus is on the access 
control system, many of the requirements can be inferred from it. We consider the 
requirements of a system for a branch, and consider a few requirements identified by 
Schaad.
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One of the key services is that of providing credit, for example, extending an 
overdraft, providing a mortgage, or offering a sum of money. Each of these involves 
different actors, and different information assets. The controls to be applied to these 
services also differ. We focus on the requirements of one of these services: the 
provision of a sum of money. The flow diagram in figure 8.1 shows some of the steps 
involved.
Evaluate
Credit
Approve
Credit
Provide Initial 
Consultation
Figure 8.1 Credit Application Process
This service is carried out by the group, customer advisory services. The provision 
of an initial consultation and the evaluation of credit are carried out by the customer 
advisory clerks. The approval of credit is done by the advisor’s manager. The function 
customer advisory services is carried out within a branch; within each branch are 
several hierarchies of authority, for each of the different specialised functions. The 
head of a branch is responsible for general banking services, and has a personnel 
function, dealing with disciplinary matters for example, but the management of 
specialised functions, such as customer advisory services, is achieved through its own 
hierarchy; thus a customer advisor clerk would take instructions from a manager in 
the same function to whom he is assigned rather than from the branch manager. 
Another function within a branch is share trading; there is a strict separation of duties 
between the functions customer advisory services and share trading within a branch.
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Market Based
Function
Based
Function
based
Market
Based
Market
Based
Marketing Bank Operations
Regional Customer 
Advisory Services
Share Trading
Regional Share 
Trading
Branch Customer 
Advisory Services
Customer 
Advisory Services
Branch Share 
Trading
Eurpopean Bank 
Private Banking
Figure 8.2 Organisational Structure of a European Bank
8.2 Deriving the Policy Model
In deriving actor definitions for our policies, the first step is to define the 
groupings within the organisation. The groupings form a composite structure. For the 
bank this is represented in figure 8.2.
We can then identify whether a grouping represents a domain in that it exists to 
serve a specific market or whether it is purely functional. From these groupings we 
can then derive the organisational functions and domains that are as follows: 
Organisational Function Customer Advisory Services 
Organisational Function Share Trading 
Organisational Domain Region
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Organisational Domain Branch 
Part Region
Within each grouping there is a hierarchical structure. Focusing on the function,
customer advisory services, in a branch, there exist the following levels of authority.
In decreasing order of authority they are:
Authority Head of Branch
Authority Manager 
Senior Head of Branch
Authority Clerk.
Senior Manager
The definition of seniority levels is necessary to distinguish roles within the same
domain and organisational function. For defining the minimum privileges it is not
necessary to know which role is senior, nevertheless, if we were to define delegation
policies, then it becomes useful.
We can now define positions within these groups, where an actor definition is
created for each level of authority. For example, the following definition shows the
Customer Advisory Services Manager position associated with the organisational
function Customer Advisory Services:
Actor Customer Advisory Services Manager 
Type Role
Organisational Function Customer Advisory Services 
Organisational Domain Branch 
Authority Manager
A similar definition can be given for a Clerk. We can now define the tasks and the
resources associated with these tasks:
Task Initial Consultation 
Resource Credit Application
Task Evaluate Credit
Resource Credit Application 
Resource Credit History
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Task Approve Credit
Resource Credit Application
This enables us to extend our actor definitions with task assignments and hence create
policies. The minimum privileges policies associated with the Customer Advisory
Services Manager and Clerk are:
Actor Customer Advisory Services Manager 
Type Role
Organisational Function Customer Advisory Services 
Organisational Domain Branch 
Authority Manager 
Task Approve Credit
Actor Customer Advisory Services Clerk 
Type Role
Organisational Function Customer Advisory Services
Organisational Domain Branch
Authority Clerk
Task Initial Consultation
Task Evaluate Credit
The authority levels of Manager and Clerk are applicable to different functional 
groupings. For example, there are clerks assigned to Customer Advisory Services, 
other clerks assigned to Share Trading, and so on. A manager is distinguished from a 
clerk in that he has the authority to delegate tasks to clerks. In order for a clerk or 
manager to be able to execute a function, they need to be assigned to a functional 
grouping in a specific branch. Hence the actor definition is a composition of the level 
of authority, organisational function, and organisational domain.
We can now demonstrate how the formal Tropos definitions map onto Alloy using 
the rules that we defined in the previous chapter. The authority level of Manager 
translates into the following Alloy construct using the corresponding meta-concept 
translation rule for authority levels: 
one sig manager extends Authority {}
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The translation of the authority level of Clerk and the seniority relationship to a
Manager maps to Alloy using the authority hierarchy translation rule as follows:
one sig clerk extends Authority {} 
fact { clerk.senior = m anager}
Similarly, mappings are carried out for organisational functions, organisational
domains, tasks, and resources, which we will not repeat here. The following role
definition is mapped from the actor definition of a Customer Advisory Services
Manager using the corresponding meta-concept translation rule for an actor:
one sig customer_advisory_services_manager extends Role {} 
fact { customer_advisory_services_manager.org_domain = branch } 
fact { customer_advisory_services_manager.authority = m anager} 
fact { customer_advisory_services_manager.org_function = 
customer_advisory_services}
The extended actor definition for the Customer Advisory Services Manager,
which includes the task assignment Approve Credit represents a restriction that
translates into Alloy using the policy definition translation rule as follows:
one sig approve_credit_policy extends Authorisation_Policy {}
fact { approve_credit_policy.task = approve_credit}
fact { approve_credit_policy.role = customer_advisory_services_manager}
The prerequisite for this definition is that the role and task definitions already exist.
Similarly. For the other tasks such as Initial Consultation and Evaluate Credit, we can
also define corresponding policies.
The next step is to define an instantiation to verify the policy. In the following
instantiation, we check that a Customer Advisory Services Manager can approve the
credit of a customer of the branch to which he is assigned. First, we define two
domain instantiations for the Frankfort and Dortmund branches:
Organisational Domain Frankfurt Branch INS Branch
Organisational Domain Dortmund Branch INS Branch
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Then, we can define an instantiation of a Customer Advisory Services Manager in the 
Frankfurt Branch:
Actor Customer Advisory Services Manager Frankfurt INS Customer Advisory 
Services Manager 
Type Role
Organisational Domain Frankfurt Branch
These two Tropos definitions are mapped into Alloy using the instantiation
translation rules. The following is a definition of the Frankfurt Branch that instantiates
Branch; i.e. it is a branch:
one sig frankfurt_branch extends Org_Domain {} 
fact {frankfurt_branch.insd = branch }
The following definition represents the instantiated role for a Customer Advisory
Services Manager in the Frankfurt Branch:
one sig customer_advisory_services_manager_frankfurt 
fact { customer_advisory_services_manager_frankfurt.insr = 
customer_advisory_services_manager}
fact { customer_advisory_services_manager_frankfurt.org_domain = frankfurt}
We also need to define the instantiations of assets and tasks. We first define the 
assets Credit Application and Credit History of the customer Philip Stokes. We assign 
these assets to the Frankfurt Branch:
Resource Credit Application of Philip Stokes INS Credit Application 
Organisational Domain Frankfurt Branch
Resource Credit History of Philip Stokes INS Credit History 
Organisational Domain Frankfurt Branch
We then define instantiations of the tasks Approve Credit Application and Initial
Consultation for the credit application of the customer Philip Stokes:
Task Approve Credit Application of Philip Stokes INS Approve Credit Application 
Resource Credit Application of Philip Stokes
Task Initial Consultation for Philip Stokes INS Initial Consultation 
Resource Credit Application of Philip Stokes 
Resource Credit History of Philip Stokes
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The definitions for the task Approve Credit Application of Philip Stoke and the 
resource Credit Application of Philip Stokes translate into our policy framework as 
follows
one sig philip_stokes_credit_application extends Asset {}
fact { philip_stokes_credit_application.insa = credit_application }
fact { philip_stokes_credit_application.asset_domain = frankfurt_branch}
one sig approve_credit_application_of_philip_stokes extends Task {} 
fact { approve_credit_application_of_philip_stokes.inst = approve_credit_application } 
fact { approve_credit_application_of_philip_stokes.task_asset_dependency = 
credit_application_of_philip_stokes}
The translation of the resource Credit History of Philip Stokes and the task Initial 
Consultation for Philip Stokes is similar.
Finally we define the scenario of Jim Smith occupying the role of the Customer 
Advisory Services Manager Frankfurt executing the task Approve Credit Application 
of Philip Stokes:
Actor Jim Smith OCCUPIES Customer Advisory Services Manager Frankfurt 
Type Agent
Task Approve Credit Application of Philip Stokes 
This agent definition is mapped into Alloy as follows: 
one sig jim_smith extends Agent {}
fact {jim_smith.role_assignment = customer_advisory_services_manager_frankfurt} 
fact {jim_smith. performs = approve_credit_application_of_philip_stokes}
We can now check the model by defining assertions. When a check command is
executed, Alloy searches for a counter example which breaks the assertion, and then
will display the state by which the solution is arrived at, otherwise the tool simply
states that no solution was found. For the purposes of demonstrating an Alloy check, a
false assertion is therefore more informative. We can demonstrate this with the
following assertion that Jim Smith who is a manager can not approve a credit
application.
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assert execute_approve_creditJim_smith {
all task: approve_credit_application_of_philip_stokes, ag: jim_smith | 
task lin ag.performs}
This can be checked by using the following check statement:
check execute_approve_credit_jim_smith for 4 but 2 Org_Function, 5 Task,
3 Authority, 3 Authorisation_Policy, 1 Agent
This check statement includes the number of instances that Alloy should generate 
for each signature type. For example we have defined the two instances, 
share_trading and customer_advisory_services, of the signature Org_Function; we 
therefore limit Alloy to generating these two organisational functions. If we were to 
define more than two, Alloy would generate additional instances itself; if we were to 
define less, then Alloy would produce an error. A default of four is given, so that 
Alloy will generate four instances of any signature type for which an explicit number 
of instances has not been given.
This assertion is a negation of what is required, and therefore we expect Alloy to 
find a solution. This is shown in figure 8.3.
We can now a similar assertion this time though to test whether Jim Smith can 
carry out an initial consultation on the credit application. In formal Tropos this 
scenario is as follows:
Actor Jim Smith OCCUPIES Customer Advisory Services Manager Frankfurt 
Type Agent
Task Initial Consultation for Philip Stokes 
In Alloy we define this as follows: 
one sig jim_smith extends Agent {}
fact {jim_smith.role_assignment = customer_advisory_services_manager_frankfurt} 
fact {jim_smith.performs = initial_consu!ation_for_philip_stokes }
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Figure 8.3 Task Execution Scenario in Alloy of Approve Credit Application
The assertion and check definitions in Alloy are as follows: 
assert execute_initial_consultationJim_smith {
all task: initial_consultation_for_philip_stokes, ag: jim_smith | Itask in ag.perform s}
check execute_initial_consultationJim_smith for 4 but 2 Org_Function, 5 Task,
3 Authority, 3 Authorisation_Policy, 1 Agent
This time the tool does not find an example, demonstrating that Jim Smith can not 
actually carry out an initial consultation. This is consistent with the policy defined 
above, that only allows clerks can perform initial consultations.
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8.3 Model Consistency Checks
The framework that we introduced in chapter 5 includes invariants that need to be 
maintained to ensure consistency. In chapter 7 we then translated these invariants into 
Alloy. For example an authority level can not be senior to itself, similarly constraints 
exist to prevent circular definitions in other hierarchies, and there are constraints to 
prevent instantiations being included in policy domain definitions. In this section we 
demonstrate, using the case study, a couple of examples of how definitions that 
violate these constraints can be identified using Alloy assertions.
The first example concerns invalid authority definitions and is as follows:
Authority Clerk 
Senior Manager 
Authority Manager 
Senior Clerk
Here we have defined the authority level of Clerk and Manager that are both senior to
one another. These definitions violate the framework constraint that a level of
authority can not be senior to itself. This can be checked by including the constraint in
an assertion and running a check, as follows:
assert authority_level_consistent { 
all au: Authority | au !in au.Asenior}
check authority_level_consistent for 4 but 2 Org_Function, 5 Task, 3 Authority,
3 Authorisation_Policy, 1 Agent
In this case Alloy finds a solution indicating that the constraint for authority levels has 
been violated.
The second example concerns an invalid role instantiation definition and is as 
follows:
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Actor Customer Advisory Services Manager Dortmund INS Customer Advisory 
Services Manager Frankfurt 
Type Role
Organisational Domain Dortmund Branch
Here we have defined a role that is instantiated from a role that is itself an instantiated
role. This violates a framework meta-model constraint. This can be checked using the
following assertion and running a check:
assert instantiated_role_consistent { 
all rolel, role2: Role | role1.insr= role2 => 
role2.insr = n o n e}
check instantiated_role_consistentfor4 but 2 Org_Function, 5 Task, 5 Role,
3 Authority, 3 Authorisation_Policy, 1 Agent
In this case Alloy finds a solution indicating that the constraint for role instantiation 
has been violated.
8.4 Evaluation of Extended Formal Tropos
For this case study it is worth reflecting on how this extended formal Tropos 
improves on existing approaches.
First of all the heuristics that we proposed enabled us to derive the actor 
definitions systematically, by deriving them from the organisational structure. The 
approach that we have adopted begins by defining organisational functions, domains 
and authority levels within these domains and hence to construct actor definitions 
from these, as we have demonstrated. In this way we derived two abstract actor 
definitions, customer advisory services clerk, and customer advisory services 
manager, from which we could instantiate into the respective actors in a specific 
branch. The current Tropos approach does not include such a set of heuristics. One 
approach that does have a set of heuristics, the ReCAPS role engineering approach 
proposed by He (2005) that we reviewed in chapter 2, derives role definitions from 
collections of tasks. However, although they can define the functional characteristics,
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the seniority and organisational domains are missing. In this particular case study the 
organisational domain, the branch, is vital in order to define policies based on the 
minimum privileges principle. The task, approve credit, that we have modelled is 
actually a step required to satisfy the principle of supervision and review, and the 
seniority relationship that we have defined is necessary to differentiate between 
different levels in the organisation; i.e. that the manager is supervising the clerk. The 
model that we have defined also makes clear that this supervisory relationship applies 
only within a branch and within the organisational function, customer advisory 
services. These characteristics can not be modelled in Tropos as it currently is.
We reviewed two approaches which do include the organisational context in 
chapter 2. ORDIT (Dobson et al., 1992) does have a role model which captures the 
hierarchical relationships between roles; as we described in chapter 2 in ORDIT 
power relationships between roles can be modelled and so enabling us to some extent 
to model the delegation of obligations. However a key element is missing is the 
organisational domain which means that relating a role to a branch would be not be a 
part of the model. Our model has also been defined formally allowing us reason about 
it and in particular verify that scenarios, such as we defined in the case study, are 
consistent with the policies defined.
8.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we presented a case study of how the framework in extended formal 
Tropos we presented in chapter 6, can be applied. The case study was taken from the 
literature of a the access policies of a large European bank. We first created a model 
of the organisational context, from which we then derived role definitions. We 
identified a few tasks carried out by the customer advisory services in a branch and
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assets which require access. We then defined policies to satisfy the minimum 
privileges principle with respect to these tasks and scenarios to verify the policies. We 
demonstrated how the formal Tropos model can be translated into the Alloy language 
and how one of the policies could be verified using an assertion. Finally we outlined 
the key advantages of this approach compared to existing alternatives, in that the 
inclusion of the organisation context, can enable us to define more precise policies 
based on the principle of minimum privileges principle and also enables us to define 
hierarchical relationships that provide a basis for the definition of principles based on 
delegation, and supervision and review.
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In this chapter we first present a summary of the thesis, then an analysis of the 
contributions, and finally a discussion and critical evaluation of the research presented 
in the thesis, which gives an account of future work.
9.1 Thesis Summary
In this thesis we have addressed the problem of modelling access policies to 
ensure that security goals can be achieved, and that operational requirements are 
consistent with access policies.
We first identified the importance of an organisational analysis before making 
actor or role definitions in the context of modelling access policies. We highlighted 
the lack of this in current modelling approaches, thus making it difficult to express 
access policies precisely, and also to refine them into operational constraints.
We proposed a framework that comprises a meta-model for formally modelling 
the organisational context, and deriving organisational role definitions. It also 
includes a set of heuristics as to how to identify groupings, the levels of authority and 
management domains, from which roles can be defined. We defined the meta-model 
in Z so enabling us to reason about it, and we demonstrated how automated checking 
could be carried out through translation into the specification language Alloy.
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We showed how this framework could be integrated into Tropos, an extended 
version of the i* framework, illustrating the complementary nature of the new 
framework to at least one existing requirements modelling approach.
9.2 Analysis of Contributions
The thesis makes a contribution to the modelling of access policies as 
requirements. In chapter 2 we identified a key weakness with respect to modelling 
policies that are derived from the principles of management control, in that actors are 
not linked to the organisational context. This makes it difficult to define policies to 
satisfy the minimum privileges principle. In chapter 3 we saw that policy languages 
such as Ponder can define these policies, because they are based on mapping groups 
and roles onto the organisational context, exemplified in Ponder by mapping groups 
onto organisational domains, and defining authority as management structures.
The framework we presented addresses the need to define and verify access 
policies in requirements models, rather than only being able to do this effectively at 
the implementation level. In effect it describes an enriched ontology based on 
concepts that we identified in the organisational literature. It is derived from the two 
key dimensions on which organisations are structured that we identified in chapter 3: 
the division of work, and the lines of authority. The framework meta-model includes 
meta-concepts that enable us to model these characteristics. We also outlined a set of 
heuristics, which give us a systematic approach to deriving these organisational 
characteristics; determined from the organisational structure on the basis by which 
groups are structured, either on a functional or market basis. This process ensures that 
roles are linked to the organisational context, with the advantage of enabling a more 
precise definition of what a role is.
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We hypothesised in chapter 2, that linking the role to the organisational context is 
a prerequisite for defining policies that satisfy the key principles of management 
control. In this thesis we focused on the minimum privileges principle, and the 
framework includes a construct for defining access policies based on this principle 
that assign tasks to roles, with tasks being related to the assets that are required to 
perform the task. The addition of organisational domains into the role definition, and 
the relationship between the role and the organisational domain to which assets are 
assigned, allows us to define policies that fully satisfy the minimum privileges 
principle. The contrast between policy constructs in our framework and policy 
frameworks used for access control, is that in our framework the policies are abstract, 
whereas policies defined for access control systems are based on instances.
We also addressed the need to be able to verify policies. As we identified in 
chapter 2, scenarios are an effective way of verifying requirements. The framework 
includes meta-concepts and constructs that enable us to define instantiations of 
organisational groupings, roles and agents that are assigned to role instantiations. This 
enables us to generate scenarios and then verify that the policies satisfy the minimum 
privileges principle. The fact that we defined the framework formally in Z gives a 
basis for reasoning about the consistency between policies and scenarios. As we 
outlined in chapter 7, performing proofs in Z, even with the support of tool, is an 
arduous process; that is the reason why we used the modelling tool Alloy for this 
purpose. We demonstrated how the Z constructs can be translated into the Alloy 
language, and how automated analysis can be carried out using the tool. The fact that 
a large model can be divided into modules, means that we can scale the approach to 
analysing systems with a large number of roles by separating the modules to map on 
to different parts of the organisation, and to separate policies and scenarios. The point
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of this demonstration is that we showed how a tool could be constructed based on the 
framework for defining policies and verifying scenarios.
A key objective, we outlined in this thesis, was to relate the framework to an 
existing requirements modelling language. For investigation we selected the i* 
framework and formal Tropos. We demonstrated how the organisational meta-model 
presented in chapter 5 can be applied to extend formal Tropos. We then examined 
how the extended formal Tropos language can be applied to define access policies, 
and scenarios. We showed how the access policies defined in formal Tropos can be 
translated into Alloy.
We used a case study from the literature to demonstrate how an extended version 
of formal Tropos could be used to define access policies. The case study concerned a 
large European bank, and we showed how policies satisfying the minimum privileges 
principle could be defined, based on a derivation of the organisational context using 
the heuristics we presented in chapter 5. We also demonstrated how policies and 
scenarios can be translated into the Alloy language and analysed using the tool.
In chapter 2 we summarised the capabilities of requirements modelling 
approaches with respect to management control principles. In table 2.2 we highlighted 
that none of the principles of management control could be adequately defined. Table 
9.1 overleaf highlights the key contribution of our work, namely that the extended 
Tropos presented in this thesis enables us to define the minimum privileges principle.
In chapter 2 we also presented, in table 2.3, the capabilities of requirements 
modelling approaches with respect to modelling the organisational context. In table 
9.2, we highlight that extended Tropos now allows us to model organisational 
domains, organisational functions, and authority relationships. It is these definitions 
that are required to define policies that satisfy the minimum privileges principle.
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However we also have a basis for defining other principles including delegation, and 
supervision and review.
Management Control Principle Extended Tropos
Minimum Privileges Principle yes
Segregation of Duties partially
Delegation and 
Revocation of Authority
partially
Supervision and Review no
Accounting Principles no
Table 9.1 Coverage of Management Control Principles by Extended Tropos
Modelling of the Organisational 
Context
Extended Tropos
Agent Assignments to Tasks 
and Resources
yes
Separation of Roles to 
Agents
yes
Organisational Domains yes
Organisational Functions yes
Authority Relationships yes
Workflow no
Table 9.2 Modelling of the Organisational Context by Extended Tropos
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9.3 Critical Analysis and Future Work
In chapter 2 we identified several commonly used management control principles. 
In this thesis we have only explored the minimum privileges principle. Other 
principles remain to be explored. Although the framework includes authority 
relationships, we have not demonstrated how we can define policies that satisfy the 
delegation and revocation of authority, or supervision and review. An opportunity for 
further research would be to extend the approach proposed by Giorgini et al. (2005) 
for modelling delegation using the i* framework. In particular, accounting principles, 
can lead to complex procedures, whereby workflows need to be modelled and 
financial constraints such as credit ratings need to be included in policies.
In defining the organisational context the examples we explored were role 
cultures, typical of large organisations. In fact the identification of roles and the link 
to the organisational is likely to be much easier in a large organisation such as a bank 
or hospital. Although these types of organisations figure prominently in the security 
literature many organisations particularly small organisations are much less formal in 
their structures. A research question therefore is to what extent this framework is valid 
for other organisational cultures and could it be adapted or extended? Furthermore, 
the organisational modelling approach that we have proposed we applied to single 
organisations, however systems can be integrated across organisational boundaries, a 
further question is therefore is to what extent would the framework enable us to model 
this type of organisational context?
We have demonstrated how to extend formal Tropos to define policies, but there 
are other approaches to modelling. Defining use cases is a widely used approach to 
modelling requirements; it would therefore be useful to explore how use cases could
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be extended, using the framework. Our demonstration of how actor definitions can be 
extended in formal Tropos could be used as a basis for this. Indeed the principle of 
how to define actors or agents and link them to the organisational context ought to be 
able to be applied to any modelling approach, by extending the syntax.
Although we have demonstrated that it is possible to analyse policies in the Alloy 
tool, if this were to become an industrial approach, then a tool would be desirable that 
would enable policy definitions to be defined in a requirements modelling language 
rather than Alloy, for example formal Tropos, or perhaps use cases. The formal 
Tropos approach uses NuSMV, which enables temporal constraints to be modelled, 
which could potentially be useful for modelling policies based on accounting 
principles. Thus a potential avenue for research would be to investigate how to 
translate extended formal Tropos definitions into NuSMV. Use cases are not generally 
formally defined, and hence if the automated checking were to be carried out a 
formalisation of use cases would be required.
The validation of our approach was based on a limited set of hypothetical case 
studies. In order to determine the extent to which this approach would work in 
practice, it is necessary to actually carry out projects. It is only by practical experience 
that an approach can be improved and refined.
9.4 Conclusions
The main objective of this thesis was to address the problem of defining access 
policies and refining them into constraints. We identified the nature of access policies, 
and also the principles by which organisations are structured and controlled. These 
principles are fundamental to the understanding of the requirements of access policies. 
The framework we have proposed includes the macro-organisational context, which
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makes it much easier to derive precise role definitions. This is one significant 
weakness of existing modelling approaches.
We have focused on the principle of minimum privileges, however in doing this 
we have created a foundation for other principles. For example the framework relates 
authority levels, which give us a basis for defining delegation. The definitions of 
organisational domain and function provide a basis for defining the segregation of 
duties.
The formal notation that we adopted in developing the framework enables us to 
reason about it. We demonstrated this using the Alloy tool, which enables assertions 
to be checked automatically.
The motivation for the research, was that in current modelling approaches there is 
a weak link between actors defined in a requirements model and the organisational 
context. In this thesis we have demonstrated that the framework we presented 
strengthens that link. It is complementary to other modelling approaches, in that it 
only focuses on the link to the organisational context, but does not prescribe how 
other aspects of a requirements model such as goals, functions, tasks and resources, 
should be defined. The framework can thus be used to further develop other 
requirements modelling approaches as we demonstrated with the i* framework.
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